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SOLVING INSOLVENT PUBLIC PENSIONS: THE 
LIMITATIONS OF THE CURRENT BANKRUPTCY OPTION 
INTRODUCTION 
Prichard, Alabama is a city of approximately 23,0001 residents in the 
southwestern corner of the state. A dwindling population2 and $3.9 million of 
debt forced Prichard to file for bankruptcy in 1999.3 After emerging from 
bankruptcy in 2007,4 the city filed again in October of 2009, this time in the 
shadow of a lawsuit by pensioners questioning the solvency of their city 
pensions.5 Prichard stopped paying pensions and the bankruptcy judge denied 
the pensioners’ claim to their pensions during the proceedings.6 The judge 
dismissed the case in March of the following year; however, Prichard failed to 
resume payments.7 Nearly two years after pension payments stopped, Prichard 
announced a settlement with its retirees that would give them only one third of 
their promised pay.8 Prichard is currently awaiting a ruling from the Alabama 
Supreme Court to determine whether their bankruptcy case can proceed.9 
The case of Prichard, Alabama is certainly unique in its circumstances, 
history, and financial and political challenges. It highlights, however, what is 
 
 1 State and County Quickfacts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/01/ 
0162496.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2011). 
 2 Michael Cooper & Mary Williams Walsh, Alabama Town’s Failed Pension is a Warning, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 22, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/23/business/23prichard.html (noting that Prichard, Alabama 
has shrunk by nearly forty percent since the 1970s). 
 3 Douglas J. Watson, Donna Handley & Wendy L. Hassett, Financial Distress and Municipal 
Bankruptcy: The Case of Prichard, Alabama, 17 J. PUB. BUDGETING ACCT. & FIN. MGMT. 129, 142 (2005). 
 4 David Ferrara, Prichard Files for Bankruptcy Protection; City Faces Lawsuit Over Nearly Empty 
Pension Fund, AL.COM (Oct. 28, 2009, 7:02 AM), http://blog.al.com/live/2009/10/prichard_files_for_ 
bankruptcy_1.html. 
 5 David Ferrara, After Bankruptcy Case Gets Tossed, Prichard Retirees Sue City, AL.COM (Sept. 2, 2010, 
6:00 AM), http://blog.al.com/live/2010/09/after_bankruptcy_case_gets_tos.html. 
 6 Order Denying Prichard Retirees’ Motion for Administrative Claim and to Compel Payment of 
Administrative Expenses, In re City of Prichard, No. 09-15000-WSS (Bankr. S.D. Ala. Mar. 10, 2010); David 
Ferrera, Motion to Force Prichard to Pay Pensioners Denied by Judge, AL.COM (March 10, 2010, 6:34 AM), 
http://blog.al.com/live/2010/03/motion_to_force_prichard_to_pa.html.  
 7 Ferrara, supra note 5. 
 8 Katherine Sayre, Prichard Pension Crisis: Judge Approves Settlement; Payments to Restart Next 
Month, AL.COM (May 25, 2011, 5:46 PM), http://blog.al.com/live/2011/05/judge_approves_prichard_pensio. 
html.  
 9 In re City of Prichard, No. 1:10-00622-KD-M, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68747, at *4 (S.D. Ala. May 17, 
2011). 
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likely to be an increasingly frequent problem for municipalities across the 
United States.10 The problems of municipalities that are unable to pay their 
pension obligations are similar to the basic problem of any debtor in 
bankruptcy: the debtor (in this case the municipality) has taken on more debt 
(including pension obligations, among other debt) than it can afford to pay. 
However, these problems are also uniquely political and have a very direct 
public impact.11 Municipalities are faced with the conundrum of how to 
provide adequate protection for pensioners without either (a) crippling 
municipal services and the basic operations of their governmental unit or (b) 
disproportionately pushing pension obligations onto the current and future 
municipal workforce and future taxpayers. 
The state law tools available for municipalities to manage these pension 
obligations are limited.12 Chapter 9, the portion of the Bankruptcy Code 
governing municipal bankruptcy, offers what may be a last resort for many 
municipalities unable to pay pension obligations. “Chapter 9 is intended to 
enable a financially distressed municipality to ‘continue to provide its residents 
with essential services such as police protection, fire protection, sewage and 
garbage removal, and schools[],’ while it works out a plan to adjust its debts 
and obligations.”13 Importantly, federal law requires that states authorize 
municipal bankruptcy,14 which a majority of states have failed to do.15 As such, 
municipalities in a majority of states are left without access to chapter 9.16 
Chapter 9 does not explicitly contemplate pensioners as debtors,17 and 
 
 10 Bill Vidonic & Debra Erdley, Pension Crisis Extends Far Beyond Pittsburgh, PITTSBURGH TRIB.-
REV., Nov. 8, 2010, http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/s_708214.html; Pension Review 
Panel Meets to Discuss Options for Atlanta’s Pension Plan, CITY OF ATLANTA, http://www.atlantaga.gov/ 
media/nr_pension_022210.aspx (last visited Jan. 4, 2011); see also Liam Dillon, Explainer: Are Pensions Fair 
Game in Bankruptcy, VOICEOFSANDIEGO.ORG (Feb. 15, 2010, 6:11 PM), http://www.voiceofsandiego.org/ 
government/article_0418be36-1aa3-11df-840f-001cc4c03286.html (showing that ongoing public suggestions 
indicate that municipal bankruptcy might be an appropriate remedy for the reported $2.1 billion in pension 
obligations that the city owes).  
 11 See, e.g., Charles Duhigg, Public Unions Take on Boss to Win Big Pensions, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/22/business/22union.html (discussing the fact that Costa Mesa, CA 
had a $100,000 public-union-funded opposition campaign to a pension reform candidate). 
 12 See, e.g., Navlet v. Port of Seattle, 194 P.3d 221, 232 (Wash. 2008) (en banc). 
 13 In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 336–37 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 100-
1011, at 2 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4115, 4116) (citation omitted).  
 14 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2006). 
 15 Only nineteen states currently authorize municipal bankruptcy. Issue Summary: Municipal Bankruptcy, 
ALLEGHENY INSTITUTE, http://www.alleghenyinstitute.org/government/munbankruptcy.html (last visited Jan. 
5, 2011). 
 16 Id. 
 17 See 11 U.S.C. § 901. But see 11 U.S.C. §§ 1113–1114. 
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Congress has recognized the need to study pension issues in municipal 
bankruptcy.18 However, to date, Congress has not modified chapter 9 to 
address potential pension concerns.19 
Changes in local practice, state laws, and federal laws are necessary to give 
municipal governments tools to manage pension debt. Local governments can, 
and should, take preventative measures to ensure that retirement obligations do 
not limit their future ability to provide basic government services while 
simultaneously honoring obligations to pensioners. However, these 
preventative measures alone will not provide the relief needed for many 
municipalities in crisis. Neither state legal structures nor federal municipal 
bankruptcy law, as they presently exist, can provide the more immediate relief 
that municipalities need, especially given the unique voter-employee, 
government-employer dynamics. For municipalities to continue providing 
essential governmental services, provisions should be added to state law to 
ensure that chapter 9, when used to manage pension debt, is both politically 
feasible and fair to pensioners. Additionally, provisions should be added to 
chapter 9 guaranteeing greater municipal employee protections for these same 
purposes. 
This Comment first summarizes current economic factors driving the recent 
increased likelihood of municipal insolvency, explores the unique taxpayer and 
voter constituency impacting municipal bankruptcy, and provides a brief 
background of municipal bankruptcy law. This Comment then reviews the 
legal framework surrounding municipalities’ options for managing pension 
obligations, including state pension and labor law. Subsequently, this 
Comment contrasts the process by which a pension is discharged and the 
manner in which employee pensions are protected in traditional chapter 11 
bankruptcy as compared to chapter 9. Next, this Comment suggests how 
chapter 9 might enable a municipality to reduce or discharge pension 
obligations and highlights the gaps in such a process. Finally, this Comment 
proposes changes in local practice and state and federal law that are necessary 
to allow municipalities in crisis to fairly and effectively manage pension 
obligations. 
 
 18 See H.R. REP. NO. 102-459, at 368 (1992) (“The depressed economic situation . . . has raised a number 
of important questions, including the treatment of labor agreements, pensions, health benefits, et cetera. The 
subcommittee may wish to review the impact of municipal bankruptcy in these areas.”). 
 19 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Current Economic Conditions and Stakeholders 
1. Federal, State, and Municipal Revenue and Debt Crises 
Municipal bankruptcy has been a rarity since Congress first authorized it in 
1934.20 However, reduced municipal revenues, coupled with increased 
municipal obligations, have given rise to speculation that more municipalities 
will consider this tool in the future.21 Moreover, Standard & Poor’s recent 
historic downgrade of the United States’ credit rating has led some to speculate 
that this national debt uncertainty could lead to further instability in the 
municipal bond market.22 
Municipal bond defaults are rare.23 Moody’s reports only fifty-four defaults 
of their rated municipal bonds since 1970, and of these, only three were 
defaults of general obligation debt.24 However, the municipal bond default 
trend suggests that they are becoming more common, with 13% of the defaults 
in the last forty years occurring in the 2008-2009 period.25 During that time 
frame, an increased number of municipal bond ratings were downgraded.26 
 
 20 See Nicholas McGrath & Ji Hun Kim, The Next Chapter for Municipal Bankruptcy, AM. BANKR. INST. 
J., June 2010, at 14, 14 (“[T]here have only been approximately 566 [c]hapter 9 filings.”). 
 21 See, e.g., id. at 14; Robert J. Landry III & Keren H. Deal, More Municipalities Likely to Face Chapter 
9: Is a Perfect Storm Brewing?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July–Aug. 2008, at 18, 72; Ianthe Jeanne Dugan & Kris 
Maher, Muni Threat: Cities Weigh Chapter 9, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052748704398804575071591602878062.html. But see Ameet Sachdev, Municipal Bankruptcy 
Fears Overblown, Official Says, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 21, 2010, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2010-09-
21/business/ct-biz-0921-chicago-law-20100921_1_bankruptcy-cases-municipal-bankruptcy-debts (arguing 
there will be an increase in municipal bond restructuring, but that such actions will be short of filing for 
municipal bankruptcy). 
 22 See Kathy Bergen, Kristen Mack & Monique Garcia, Debt-rating Deluge Could Trickle Down to 
Cities and States, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 9, 2011, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-08-09/business/ct-biz-
0809-downgrade-bonds-20110809_1_rating-downgrade-mcdonnell-investment-management-llc-credit-ratings. 
 23 See infra notes 244–47 and accompanying text. 
 24 MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, U.S. MUNICIPAL BOND DEFAULTS AND RECOVERIES, 1970–2009, at 2 
(2010), available at http://v2.moodys.com/cust/content/Content.ashx?source=StaticContent/Free%20Pages/ 
Regulatory%20Affairs/Documents/us_municipal_bond_defaults_and_recoveries_02_10.pdf (finding that a 
majority of these defaults were in areas of specific government focus, namely the healthcare and housing 
project finance sector). 
 25 Id. at 2, 12–13 (finding seven defaults in the 2008–2009 period and fifty-four between 1970–2009); 
see also infra notes 244–47 and accompanying text. 
 26 U.S. MUNICIPAL BOND DEFAULTS AND RECOVERIES, supra note 24, at 7. 
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A substantial portion of municipal revenue is dependent upon property 
values,27 so when these values decline, cities are hit hard.28 The exact 
percentage of municipal funding from property tax varies, but averages 71.4% 
of local tax revenue.29 The third quarter of 2010 marked the seventeenth 
consecutive quarter of falling home values,30 and foreclosures hit record highs 
in 2010.31 In Clark County, Nevada, which includes Las Vegas, 71.1% of 
homeowners owed more on their homes than they were worth as of September 
31, 2010.32 
During this tight budget period, federal funding was appropriated in the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA),33 in part to fill the gaps 
for state and local governments.34 Congress enacted ARRA in February 2009 
for the purpose of stimulating the United States economy and “[stabilizing] 
State and local government budgets, in order to minimize and avoid reductions 
in essential services and counterproductive state and local tax increases.”35 
Funding from ARRA accounted for $60 billion of the states’ $192 billion 
shortfall in fiscal year 2010.36 Additionally, this federal stimulus package 
provided discretionary spending for local governments in the form of grants to 
local law enforcement, firefighters, and other funds.37 
 
 27 MELISSA BRAYBROOKS, JULIO RUIZ & ELIZABETH ACCETTA, STATE GOVERNMENT TAX COLLECTIONS 
SUMMARY REPORT: 2010, at 5 (2011), available at http://www2.census.gov/govs/statetax/2010stcreport. 
pdf (indicating in a 2007 Census of State Governments report that the average municipality received 71.4% of 
revenue from property taxes). 
 28 Sioban Hughes, For Strapped Cities, a New Normal, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27, 2011, http://online.wsj. 
com/article/SB10001424052970204831304576596973923470178.html (discussing a National League of 
Cities survey that found that revenue declines, largely from property tax declines, had led to fee increases, 
layoffs, and salary freezes in many cities). 
 29 BRAYBROOKS, RUIZ & ACCETTA, supra note 27, at 5. 
 30 Steve Goldstein, Home Values Down for 17th Straight Quarter: Report, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2010, 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/home-values-down-for-17th-straight-quarter-report-2010-11-10. 
 31 William Alden, Foreclosures Hit Record High in August, HUFFINGTON POST, Sept. 16, 2010, http:// 
www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/09/16/foreclosures-hit-record_n_719912.html. 
 32 Chart: Owing More Than Home Is Worth, USA TODAY, Feb. 8, 2011, http://www.usatoday.com/ 
money/economy/housing/2011-02-04-under-water-chart_N.htm. 
 33 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 [hereinafter 
Federal Stimulus Package]. 
 34 Shawn Tully, Meredith Whitney’s New Target: The States, FORTUNE, Sept. 28, 2010, http://finance. 
fortune.cnn.com/2010/09/28/meredith-whitneys-new-target-the-states/. 
 35 Federal Stimulus Package, supra note 33, § 3(a)(5). 
 36 Tully, supra note 34. 
 37 Federal Stimulus Package, supra note 33, §§ 105, 509 (including funding for local law enforcement, 
local disaster assistance, firefighter, and school funding, among other funds directed to local governments). 
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There was no comparable federal funding in federal fiscal year 2011,38 
however, and many states are implementing draconian budget cuts39 or tax 
increases40 to try to make up for current shortfalls. Additionally, Congress’s 
August 2011 debt-ceiling deal called for $900 million in federal budget cuts 
over the next decade, which will invariably impact out-year federal aid to 
states.41 With state funding providing roughly one third of municipal budgets, 
it is reasonable to assume that these local governments will experience 
increased challenges in their ability to remain current on municipal debt 
obligations and in their ability to provide essential public services to citizens.42 
These revenue pressures have left municipalities particularly vulnerable to the 
consequences of declining revenue sources and poor investment strategies.43 
2. Municipal Legal Obligations 
In the face of decreasing revenues and eroding tax digests, municipalities 
are often faced with increasing “legacy obligations.”44 These legacy 
 
 38 The “Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010” signed by 
President Obama on December 17, 2010 includes a 2% cut to 2011 Social Security taxes among other tax cuts 
including extension of the group of income tax and other tax cuts that have been referred to as the “Bush tax 
cuts.” Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
312, 124 Stat. 3296. This tax cut package has been considered by some to be another federal stimulus bill. See, 
e.g., U.S. Tax Bill Is Stimulus in Disguise, Interview by Jason Stipp with Bob Johnson, Director of Economic 
Analysis, Morningstar (Dec. 13, 2010), available at http://www.morningstar.co.uk/uk/news/article.aspx. 
However, even if the Act is viewed as a stimulus, it is not in the form of funds made directly to state or local 
governments. 
 39 Andrew Heining, Schwarzenegger Calls for Deep California Budget Cuts, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, 
May 15, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2010/0515/Schwarzenegger-calls-for-deep-California-
budget-cuts. 
 40 Randal C. Archibold, In Arizona’s Latest Twist, Voters Follow G.O.P. Governor and Approve Tax 
Increase, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/20/us/20tax.html. 
 41 See Michael A. Fletcher, With Debt Deal, States Brace for Cuts in Federal Aid, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 
2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/with-debt-deal-states-brace-for-cuts-in-federalaid/ 
2011/08/02/gIQANdRWqI_story.html. 
 42 Tully, supra note 34 (predicting that the widening gap between local government spending and 
revenues puts municipal bonds at risk). But see Nelson D. Schwartz, A Seer on Banks Raises a Furor on 
Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/08/business/economy/08whitney.html 
(discussing critics’ belief that speculation that the municipal bond market is in trouble is overstated). 
 43 Lisa Lambert, Special Report: The Incinerator That May Burn Muni-Investors, REUTERS, May 12, 
2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE64B2PM20100512 (noting that Harrisburg’s interest on the 
debt for a trash burning plant left the city with $3 million more in interest payments on the debt in 2010 than 
the city’s budget). 
 44 See Kaiser Aluminum Files for Chapter 11 Protection; Cites Asbestos Suits, ANDREWS DEL. CORP. 
LITIG. REP., Mar. 2002, at 1, 10 (“Kaiser Aluminum Corp. filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection citing 
‘unwieldy legacy obligations including asbestos litigation.’”); George McGregor, The Implications of GASB 
45 on Early Retirees, J. COMPENSATION & BENEFITS, Nov.–Dec. 2009, at 17, 18 (defining benefit pension 
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obligations often include payments to retirees.45 For example, municipalities 
may be obligated to provide for pensions46 or “other post employment 
benefits”47 such as retiree healthcare.48 While these “other post-employment 
benefit” liabilities are certainly pressing issues for many state and local 
governments,49 there are often unique and, at times more flexible, state laws 
that govern these benefits.50 As such, discussing these benefits in municipal 
bankruptcy is beyond the scope of this Comment. Rather, this Comment will 
focus on municipal pension obligations, a form of legacy obligation with often 
strict state statutory and constitutional limitations that prevent the municipality 
from reducing benefits to prevent insolvency.51 
 
plans, Social Security, and Medicare and Medicaid are given as examples of “legacy obligations”); Mark J. 
Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 727, 759 n.78 (providing the 
example of legacy costs as being “‘health-care and other benefits for the company’s 85,000 retirees’” (quoting 
Robert Guy Matthews, W.L. RossFirm to Buy LTV Assets for $125 Million, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2002, at 
A6)). 
 45 See, e.g., Hal Dardick, Chicago Faces Crisis Over Pension Funding, How to Pay for It, CHI. 
BREAKING NEWS CTR., Oct. 18, 2010, http://www.chicagobreakingnews.com/2010/10/chicago-faces-crisis-
over-pension-funding-how-to-pay-for-it.html. 
 46 See, e.g., id. 
 47 Jenna Amato Moran, The OPEB Tsunami: Riding the Wave of Public Sector Postemployment Health 
Benefits, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 677, 677, 682 (2010) (discussing the Governmental Accounting Standards Board 
(GASB)’s promulgation of new standards for the reporting of “other postemployment benefit” or OPEB 
liability, which consists of non-pension post-employment benefits including retiree healthcare expenses). 
 48 See, e.g., Martin Z. Braun, New York City’s Retiree Health Costs Increase 14.5 Percent to $75 Billion, 
BLOOMBERG, Dec. 10, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-10/new-york-city-s-retiree-health-
costs-rise-14-5-to-75-billion-on-reform.html; Catherine Kavanaugh, Retiree Healthcare Strains City Budget, 
DAILY TRIB. (Oakland Cnty., Mich.), Jan. 8, 2011, http://www.dailytribune.com/articles/2011/01/08/news/ 
doc4d29042cc1bc7926684857.txt. 
 49 The new GASB accounting standards shifted from what was a “pay-as-you-go” model to one that 
requires government employers to “calculate the present amount it expects to pay out for OPEB for its current 
retirees and employees. The employer must then take this number and determine what annual contribution is 
required in order to adequately fund its OPEB liability over thirty years.” Moran, supra note 47, at 684–85. 
These new standards essentially created “new” massive unfunded liabilities for state and local governments. 
See, e.g., Braun, supra note 48 (reporting that New York City was saddled with $75 billion in retiree and other 
post employment benefit liability which outstripped the $42.2 billion in reported pension unfunded liability). 
 50 See, e.g., Doyle v. City of Medford, 606 F.3d 667, 669 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that retiree health 
insurance benefits were not a property right protected by the Due Process clause of the U.S. Constitution); 
Lippman v. Bd. of Educ., 487 N.E.2d 897, 898 (N.Y. 1985) (finding the local board of education’s decision to 
reduce their share of retiree healthcare premiums did not violate the state constitutional mandate protecting 
pensions as contractual relationships, as “there was no contract, express or implied, by respondent Board of 
Education not to reduce its contribution to payment of health insurance premiums of retired employees and 
their dependents”). But see Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. and Mun. Emp. v. City of Benton, 513 F.3d 874, 882 
(8th Cir. 2008) (finding the City’s elimination of certain retiree healthcare benefits was a violation of the 
retirees’ constitutional rights to contract because the benefits were specified in the collective bargaining 
agreement). 
 51 See, e.g., Navlet v. Port of Seattle, 194 P.3d 221, 232 (Wash. 2008) (en banc) (“It is the law of this 
State that an employee has a vested right in the pension or retirement system in effect when he becomes a 
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In light of the many revenue and budgetary pressures faced by 
municipalities, including declining property tax, employment tax, and sales tax 
income, additional difficulties result when local governments attempt to make 
up the shortfalls in pension revenues by drawing down pension reserves or 
funds from pension trusts and from funding pension obligations by continuing 
current employee contributions. When faced with declining public employment 
and shrinking pension trust reserves, the strategic decision to fund pension 
obligations by these dwindling revenue sources is not economically viable. 
3. Municipal Obligation, Political Pressures, and Legal Limitations 
The multiple and intertwined constituencies involved in municipal pension 
obligations cause any potential solution to be subject to political pressures that 
may not be present to the same degree in chapter 11.52 Municipal employees 
entitled to a pension, both those presently working and those retired, are in 
many cases also taxpayers footing the bill for municipal obligations, and more 
importantly, voters choosing whether to keep “management” in office.53 
The individual residents and businesses that are paying taxes, purchasing 
goods and property, and employing residents within a municipality have the 
ability to relocate. This competitive pressure drives what has been described as 
a “tax maximization” point54 where, at some level, municipal taxes are so high, 
the expected revenue cannot be raised.55 Additionally, individual municipal 
residents are also voters, and thus any municipal government action is subject 
to resident oversight that is not in any way diminished during bankruptcy or 
other state debt management actions. This can be contrasted with the role of 
 
qualified employee, or which becomes effective during his employment, and that system cannot be altered to 
his detriment without a corresponding benefit to him.” (quoting Abels v. Snohomish Cnty. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 
1, 849 P.2d 1258, 1265 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993))).  
 52 5 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR. & WILLIAM L. NORTON III, NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 3D 
§ 91:1 (2008) (explaining that chapter 11 is the portion of the Bankruptcy Code that governs bankruptcy 
proceedings initiated by the debtor where, in most cases, the debtor remains as the debtor-in-possession).  
 53 In many states, there is also a municipal worker labor union or unions that are charged with 
representing the interests of current employees which creates an additional dynamic in employer/employee 
relations. See, e.g., AFSCME, http://www.afscme.org/home (last visited Oct. 12, 2011).  
 54 Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Conceptual Introduction to 
Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 466 (1993). 
 55 Id. at 466 n.186 (citing In re Sanitary and Improvement Dist., #7, 98 B.R. 970, 976 (Bankr. D. Neb. 
1989)); see also Wright v. City of Coral Gables, 137 F.2d 192, 196 (5th Cir. 1943) (Waller, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (“[I]f special further Court-ordered and enforced levies were made the rate of 
taxation would be so high as to prevent property owners from paying their taxes . . . .”), aff’d, 321 U.S. 753 
(1944).  
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shareholders in a chapter 11 reorganization. While shareholders often have a 
similar voter-constituency sway over management of a public company, their 
financial interests are no longer primary.56 Thus, in a chapter 11 bankruptcy 
proceeding, the court requires that management make decisions in the best 
interest of the debtor’s estate, rather than in the interest of shareholders.57 
Other than pensioners, a municipality’s creditors are, by and large, 
“faceless” municipal bondholders that in most cases reside far away from the 
municipality. Coupled with the dynamics of the voter and taxpayer 
constituency, this can contribute to a decision-making bias that might 
encourage elected officials to place the interests of current residents and 
taxpayers before the interests of creditors. 
Finally, because the municipality receives its authority through the state in 
which it resides,58 the municipality is governed by state laws regarding debt 
and pension obligations59 and potentially subject to, and sometimes the 
beneficiary of, state intervention in the case of a distressed or insolvent 
municipality.60 The needs and interests of all of these parties contribute to an 
environment that is far more politicized than bankruptcies in chapter 11. These 
political pressures must be considered when drafting or amending chapter 9. 
B. Tools Available Under Chapter 9 
Chapter 9 of title 11 of the U.S. Code (the “Code”) provides a federal 
system for restructuring municipal debts.61 Importantly, chapter 9 of the Code 
 
 56 Martin J. Bienenstock, Once in Bankruptcy, Whose Company is it Anyways?, in CURRENT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY AND REORGANIZATION 1991, at 667, 679 (PLI Comm. Law & Practice, 
Course Handbook Ser. No. A4-4333, 1991) (“One of the most painful facts of bankruptcy is that the interests 
of shareholders become subordinated to the interests of creditors.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 57 See, e.g., C.W. Mining Co. v. Aquila, Inc. (In re CW Mining Co.), 636 F.3d 1257, 1265 (10th Cir. 
2011), cert. denied, No. 10-1412, 2011 WL 4530206 (Oct. 3, 2011) (stating that the purpose of the debtor’s 
continued existence is to “maximiz[e] the value of the estate for its creditors, not its shareholders”). 
 58 See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (specifying the process by which state law can establish 
municipalities); Jonathan J. Spitz, Federalism, States and the Power to Regulate Municipal Bankruptcies: Who 
May Be a Debtor Under Section 109(c), 9 BANKR. DEV. J. 621, 630 (1993) (“A municipality is merely a 
department of the State, and the State may withhold, grant or withdraw powers as it sees fit.”). 
 59 See, e.g., 53 PA. STAT. ANN. § 895.101-.803 (West 2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 185.01-.60 (West 2011). 
 60 See, e.g., Heather M. Forrest, State Court Receivership Alternative to Chapter 9, AM. BANKR. INST. J., 
Oct. 2010, at 12, 83 (discussing a Rhode Island state law that requires a fiscal overseer and other requirements 
in the case of a municipal fiscal emergency). 
 61 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2006) (providing that a municipality’s access to chapter 9 is conditioned upon 
the state’s authorization). 
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excludes several provisions that would otherwise apply in chapter 1162 and 
includes unique protections for the municipal debtor prompted, in part, by 
federalism concerns.63 To put the options available to municipalities under 
today’s bankruptcy laws in context, it is helpful to understand the history of 
municipal bankruptcy statutes.  
1. A Brief History of Municipal Bankruptcy 
The predecessors to today’s federal municipal bankruptcy statutes were 
first enacted in 1934 in the wake of the Great Depression.64 During the Great 
Depression, there were reportedly 2,019 municipalities in default in the United 
States.65 Congress originally authorized municipal access to the Code because 
states were constitutionally limited from impairing contracts and thus the states 
were “powerless to assist municipalities.”66 The Supreme Court declared this 
first municipal bankruptcy act unconstitutional in Ashton v. Cameron County 
Water Improvement District in 1936 because the act was held to impair state 
sovereignty.67 Congress responded by passing an amended municipal 
bankruptcy act68 containing a number of new requirements for entering 
municipal bankruptcy and other state protections. This act was upheld by the 
Supreme Court in United States v. Bekins.69 
The federal municipal bankruptcy statutes were overhauled in 1976 
partially in response to New York City’s fiscal crisis.70 While these changes 
were implemented to enable big cities to more readily invoke the protections of 
municipal bankruptcy, they served to make bankruptcy more accessible to 
municipalities in general.71 The 1976 revisions removed the requirement that a 
 
 62 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 109; Id. §§ 1113–1114. 
 63 Spitz, supra note 58, at 626.  
 64 Municipal Bankruptcy Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 251, 48 Stat. 798 (1934) invalidated by Ashton v. 
Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513 (1936). 
 65 Spitz, supra note 58, at 622. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Ashton, 298 U.S. at 531 (“The sovereignty of the state essential to its proper functioning under the 
Federal Constitution cannot be surrendered; it cannot be taken away by any form of legislation.”). 
 68 McConnell & Picker, supra note 54, at 427–28.  
 69 United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 50–51 (1938) (“The statute is carefully drawn so as to not 
impinge upon the sovereignty of the State.”). 
 70 ADVANCED CHAPTER ELEVEN BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE § 15.5, at 436 (Thomas. J. Salerno et. al. eds. 
1996 & Supp. 2010) (“Municipal bankruptcy law remained largely unchanged until 1976. Then the financial 
crisis of New York City appeared to be leading to a municipal bankruptcy. That created a great deal of 
reanalysis of municipal reorganizations and a review of bankruptcy law’s usefulness for major municipal 
entities.”). 
 71 5 NORTON, supra note 52, § 90:2. 
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municipality obtain the prepetition consent of greater than 50% of its creditors 
and enabled a municipality to continue borrowing to provide essential services 
to citizens throughout the duration of the bankruptcy.72 
2. Chapter 9 Petitioner Requirements 
Given that municipalities are public entities protected by the Tenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,73 chapter 9 is unique from its consumer 
and business counterparts.74 Notably, all municipal bankruptcy filings must be 
voluntary and cannot be initiated by a creditor.75 Additionally, there is no 
process under federal municipal bankruptcy law for liquidation of the 
municipality.76 
There are five requirements to qualify as a debtor under chapter 9:77 (1) 
The petitioner must be a municipality, which is defined as a “political 
subdivision or public agency or instrumentality of a state”;78 (2) the petitioner 
must be insolvent; (3) the petitioner must desire a plan to adjust its debts;79 (4) 
the petitioner must be authorized by the state to access chapter 9;80 and (5) the 
petitioner must engage in good faith negotiations prior to filing the petition 
unless such negotiations are impractical or a municipality “reasonably believes 
that a creditor may attempt to obtain a preference.”81 
The fourth requirement, that the state specifically authorize municipal 
access to the Code, limits most municipalities from employing this tool. 
Currently, nineteen states authorize municipal bankruptcy in some form.82 
 
 72 1 NORTON, supra note 52, § 3-A:4. 
 73 U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”); see also In re Sullivan 
Cnty. Reg’l Refuse Disposal Dist., 165 B.R. 60, 73 n.41 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1994) (“A municipality has only those 
powers granted by the state. Unless state law has authorized the municipality to seek protection under federal 
law, use of the Bankruptcy Code would implicate the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.”).  
 74 5 NORTON, supra note 52, § 90:4.  
 75 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303(a), 901(a) (2006). 
 76 See id. § 901(a).  
 77 Id. § 109(c); 5 NORTON, supra note 52, § 90:5.  
 78 11 U.S.C. § 101(40). 
 79 This requirement is meant to deter municipalities from filing solely to evade creditors. Nicholas B. 
Malito, Municipal Bankruptcy: An Overview of Chapter 9 and a Critique of the “Specifically Authorized” and 
“Insolvent” Eligibility Requirements of 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(c), 17 NORTON J. BANKR L. & PRAC. 517, 525 
(2008). 
 80 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2). 
 81 5 NORTON, supra note 52, § 90:5.  
 82 ALLEGHENY INSTITUTE, supra note 15.  
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Within these states, there is a range of approaches to authorization, including 
blanket authorization of chapter 983 and discretionary systems that condition 
access to chapter 9 upon consent of the Governor or a municipal finance 
commission.84 One state explicitly forbids all municipalities within the state 
from filing for bankruptcy.85 The majority of states have not expressly 
addressed this point by statute.86 While the authorization requirement has 
existed since the enactment of the Code, the 1994 amendments87 changed the 
authorization requirement from “general” to “specific” authorization.88 
Specific authorization “must be ‘exact, plain, and direct with well-defined 
limits so that nothing is left to inference or implication.’”89 Accordingly, most 
states do not authorize chapter 9 bankruptcy relief. The lack of state 
authorization has left some financially distressed municipalities clamoring for 
their state to open the door to chapter 9.90 
The definition of municipality in the Code does not include states, and, as 
such, states cannot file for chapter 9 bankruptcy.91 Some policy makers have 
recently suggested that states should be allowed to declare bankruptcy 
specifically to enable states to manage debt burdens like pension obligations.92 
 
 83 See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53760 (West 2011) (authorizing “any county, city, district, public 
authority, public agency, or other entity, without limitation, that is a ‘municipality,’ as defined in [11 U.S.C. 
§ 101(40)], or that qualifies as a debtor under any other federal bankruptcy law applicable to local public 
entities”). 
 84 Frederick Tung, After Orange County: Reforming California Municipal Bankruptcy Law, 53 
HASTINGS L.J. 885, 916–17 (2002). 
 85 GA. CODE ANN. § 36-80-5(a) (West 2011) (“No county, municipality, school district, authority, 
division, instrumentality, political subdivision, or public body corporate created under the Constitution or laws 
of this state shall be authorized to file a petition for relief from payment of its debts as they mature or a petition 
for composition of its debts under any federal statute providing for such relief or composition or otherwise to 
take advantage of any federal statute providing for the adjustment of debts of political subdivisions and public 
agencies and instrumentalities.”).  
 86 Tung, supra note 84, at 888. 
 87 See 6 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 900.LH[6] (Alan N. Resnick & Harry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed. 
2011). 
 88 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(2) (2006). 
 89 In re Timberon Water & Sanitation Dist., No. 9-07-12142 ML, 2008 WL 5170581, at *2 (Bankr. 
D.N.M. June 18, 2008) (quoting In re Slocum Lake Drainage Dist. of Lake Cnty., 336 B.R. 387, 390 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 2006)); see also Suntrust Bank v. Alleghany-Highlands Econ. Dev. Auth. (In re Alleghany-Highlands 
Econ. Dev. Auth.), 270 B.R. 647, 648–49 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2001); In re Cnty. of Orange, 183 B.R. 594, 604 
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995). 
 90 See, e.g., Monica Davey, Michigan Town is Left Pleading for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/28/us/28city.html. 
 91 11 U.S.C. § 101(40). 
 92 See Lisa Lambert, State Bankruptcy Bill Imminent, Gingrich Says, REUTERS, Jan. 21, 2011, available 
at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/21/us-usa-states-bankruptcy-idUSTRE70K6PI20110121; see also 
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These proposals, however, have met resistance from state officials who have 
expressed concern that such an option would increase interest rates in the 
municipal bond market.93 
3. Provisions of Chapter 9 
Federal law prohibits a bankruptcy court from exercising power that would 
interfere with any governmental or political powers of the municipality or any 
property or revenues of the municipality.94 This limits the court’s role in 
municipal bankruptcy, especially compared to chapter 11 bankruptcies.95 In 
municipal bankruptcy, the court does not engage in management of the day-to-
day affairs of the municipality, nor is the municipality limited in how it can 
“use, sell or lease its property.”96 
The immediate benefits to filing a chapter 9 bankruptcy petition are, in 
many ways, similar to those in chapter 11 bankruptcy.97 As in chapter 11, a 
filed petition operates as a stay,98 prohibiting judgments and actions by 
creditors under the general provisions of the Code99 but with limited 
expansions to the stay for certain tax actions.100 In general, the creditor’s 
remedies may be more limited when the debtor is a public entity afforded 
sovereign immunity.101 However, the stay in bankruptcy affords the 
municipality relief from any authorized state debt collection methods such as a 
 
Mary Williams Walsh, A Path is Sought for States to Escape Their Debt Burdens, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/21/business/economy/21bankruptcy.html. 
 93 Press Release, National Governor’s Association, NGA Statement Regarding Bankruptcy Proposals for 
States (Jan. 25, 2011) (on file with author), available at http://www.nga.org/cms/home/news-room/news-
releases/page_2011/col2-content/main-content-list/nga-statement-regarding-bankrupt.html (“The nation’s 
governors strongly oppose federal proposals to provide states with bankruptcy protection. Allowing states to 
declare bankruptcy is not an authority state leaders have asked for nor would they use. The mere existence of a 
law allowing states to declare bankruptcy only serves to increase interest rates, raise the costs of state 
government and create more volatility in financial markets.”).  
 94 11 U.S.C. § 904; 6 COLLIER, supra note 87, ¶ 904.01.  
 95 6 COLLIER, supra note 87, ¶ 904.01[1].  
 96 Id. ¶ 904.01[2]. 
 97 Tung, supra note 84, at 893–98.  
 98 11 U.S.C. § 922. 
 99 Id. §§ 362, 901. 
 100 Id. § 922(a); see also 6 COLLIER, supra note 87, ¶ 922.02[1]–[2] (describing how § 922(a) provides a 
stay for “actions against an officer or inhabitant of the debtor or against taxes or assessments owed to the 
debtor” and “attempt[s] to enforce a lien on or ‘arising out of’ taxes or assessments owed to the debtor”).  
 101 See, e.g., Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1305 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that cities and counties do not 
receive sovereign immunity per se, but they may be entitled to such immunity when acting as an arm of the 
state). 
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seizure of municipal bank accounts or a levy on municipal assets,102 and 
encourages creditors to negotiate with the governmental entity.103 In the case 
of pension debt, this might operate to stay any suit against the municipality to 
enforce state law obligations to pay pensions.104 
Chapter 9 does incorporate many of the provisions of chapter 11 that 
impact the reorganization of debts, including the ability of the debtor to assume 
or reject executory contracts and unexpired leases.105 Congress specifically 
avoided defining the phrase “executory contract,” however courts have 
understood this phrase to mean “contracts on which performance remains due 
to some extent on both sides.”106 Courts have often relied on the definition 
promulgated by Professor Countryman107 which defines an executory contract 
as “a contract under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other 
party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to 
complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the 
performance of the other.”108 
Chapter 9 also provides for the debtor to file a plan for the adjustment of its 
debts.109 The ability to negotiate a plan of adjustment with creditors110 is 
central to municipal bankruptcy.111 As with chapter 11, a debtor in chapter 9 
can “cram down”112 a plan on unwilling creditors as long as one class of 
 
 102 See, e.g., Silver Sage Partners v. City of Desert Hot Springs (In re City of Desert Hot Springs), 339 
F.3d 782, 787 (9th Cir. 2003) (issuing a stay limiting judgment creditor from seizing the city’s bank accounts 
and levying against the city’s assets). 
 103 Omer Kimhi, Reviving Cities: Legal Remedies to Municipal Financial Crises, 88 B.U. L. REV. 633, 
651 (2008). 
 104 See Ferrara, supra note 5. 
 105 11 U.S.C. §§ 365, 901. 
 106 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 55 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5844; H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, 
at 347 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6303. 
 107 David G. Heiman, Executory Contracts, Employee Relations and Pension Claims, Interim 
Distributions and Acquisition of Interests in Chapter 11 Companies, in CHAPTER 11 BUSINESS 
REORGANIZATIONS 1991, at 215, 228 (PLI Commercial Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 564, 
1991). 
 108 Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1972). 
 109 11 U.S.C. § 941. 
 110 Id. § 943. 
 111 Tung, supra note 84, at 888–89 (basic purpose of municipal bankruptcy is to give a municipality 
“breathing room” from creditors and to allow them to formulate a repayment plan).  
 112 The bankruptcy court has the power to “force confirmation of a reorganization plan notwithstanding 
the dissent of one or more classes of creditors or ownership interests,” also known as a “cramdown.” 7 
COLLIER, supra note 87, ¶ 1111.03[1][a][iii]. The plan must be “fair and equitable, with respect to each class 
of claims or interests that is impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan,” and the plan cannot discriminate 
unfairly. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1). These provisions help to ensure that the various classes of creditors have 
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impaired creditors approves the plan.113 Chapter 9 adopts the chapter 11 
requirement for a cramdown that secured creditors receive no less in 
bankruptcy than the value of their secured claim.114 However, since there are 
no shareholders in a municipality, and therefore often no class “junior” to 
unsecured creditors, these creditors are particularly vulnerable in a 
cramdown.115 Even where not explicitly used, the threat of such a measure 
leads to increased cooperation in bankruptcy, especially from unsecured 
creditors.116 
A bankruptcy court must confirm the plan117 in municipal bankruptcy if the 
following conditions are met: 
1. the debtor complies with all of the provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code made applicable to a chapter 9 case (e.g., provisions addressing 
disclosure and solicitation requirements, classification and treatment 
of claims, good faith requirement); 
2. the debtor complies with all of the requirements of chapter 9; 
3. all amounts to be paid by the debtor for services or expenses in the 
case or incident to the plan are disclosed and are reasonable; 
4. the debtor is not prohibited by law from taking any action 
necessary to implement the plan; 
5. the plan provides for payment in full of all administrative expense 
claims,118 unless the holder of such claims agrees to different 
treatment; 
6. all regulatory or electoral approval for any action to be taken under 
the plan has been obtained; and 
7. the plan is in the best interest of creditors and is feasible.119 
 
balanced leverage in the plan settlement negotiating process. G. Ray Warner, The Anti-Bankruptcy Act—
Revised Article 9 and Bankruptcy, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 3, 74 (2001). One consequence of the 
cramdown provisions are that creditors, under the threat of a cramdown, will at times accept reaffirmation or 
other negotiations at less than the claim amount. Jean Braucher, Counseling Consumer Debtors to Make Their 
Own Informed Choices—A Question of Professional Responsibility, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 165, 180 
(1997).  
 113 11 U.S.C §§ 901(a), 1129(a)–(b). 
 114 Id. §§ 901(a), 1129(b)(2)(A).  
 115 McConnell & Picker, supra note 54, at 464. 
 116 See id.  
 117 6 COLLIER, supra note 87, ¶ 943.03 (noting that 11 U.S.C. § 943 does not mandate that a judge cannot 
confirm a plan if the conditions in § 943 are not met, but the implication is that the conditions must be met). 
 118 5 NORTON, supra note 52, § 90:20 (explaining that, unlike chapter 11 bankruptcy, the operating 
expenses of the municipality, such as employee salaries and benefits, are not included in the fifth requirement 
that the municipality pay administrative expenses). 
 119 Francisco Vasquez & Eric Daucher, Restructuring a Municipality Under Chapter 9, AM. BANKR. INST. 
J., July–Aug. 2010, at 50, 51. 
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There are several significant ways in which the conditions for approval of a 
municipal bankruptcy plan differ from traditional bankruptcy. For example, 
like in chapter 11, the plan must be “in the best interests of creditors.”120 Under 
chapter 11, this phrase has been interpreted to mean that the creditors can 
receive no less than they would if the debtor were liquidated under chapter 
7.121 However, given that liquidation is not an option under chapter 9, 
legislative history and case law122 suggest that a plan in chapter 9 meets the 
“best interest of the creditors” test if the plan is all a creditor can “reasonably 
expect” in consideration of evidence of the municipality’s tax base, its service 
requirements to the municipality’s inhabitants, and the level to which taxes can 
be raised to fund the plan. 123 
II. PENSION BENEFITS UNDER CHAPTER 11 BANKRUPTCY 
Before analyzing the application of current municipal bankruptcy laws to 
municipal pensions, it is helpful to understand, by way of contrast and 
comparison,124 the process by which business entities manage pension debt in a 
chapter 11 bankruptcy.125 There are significant differences between federal 
law’s governance of pensions under chapter 11 versus chapter 9. A thorough 
understanding of chapter 11’s processes points to the changes necessary to 
make chapter 9 a better tool with which to manage pension insolvency. 
A. Intersection of ERISA Law and Chapter 11 
Federal law defines a pension plan as any employer plan that “provides 
retirement income to employees, or results in a deferral of income by 
employees for periods extending to the termination of covered employment or 
 
 120 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7) (2006). 
 121 5 NORTON, supra note 52, § 90:20.  
 122 124 CONG. REC. 32,403 (1978) (statement of Rep. Don Edwards) (“The best interest of creditors test 
does not mean liquidation value as under chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act. In making such a determination, it 
is expected that the court will be guided by standards set forth in Kelley v. Everglades Drainage District, 319 
U.S. 415 (1943) and Fano v. Newport Heights Irrigation Dist., 114 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1940), as under present 
law, the bankruptcy court should make such findings as detailed as possible to support a conclusion that this 
test has been met.”). 
 123 5 NORTON, supra note 52, § 90:20 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord In re Corcoran Hosp. 
Dist., 233 B.R. 449, 453–54 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1985) (holding that the chapter 9 plan was in the best interest of 
creditors where it was based on reasonably anticipated expenses and income). 
 124 Note, for example, that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) does not apply to 
governmental entities. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1). 
 125 Because there is no liquidation option in a chapter 9 bankruptcy, this comparison will not be made to 
chapter 7. See 11 U.S.C § 901. 
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beyond.”126 Under this definition, the term “pension” includes “defined benefit 
plans,” which are pension plans other than individual account plans.127 Defined 
benefit plans provide a guaranteed payment to the pensioner upon retirement 
based on an employee’s salary and years of employment.128 A pension is said 
to “vest” when the employee has completed the minimum amount of time 
necessary to receive any retirement pay.129 Importantly, government pension 
plans are not governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA).130 
ERISA was signed into law in 1974 and, among other things, required 
certain minimum funding levels for pension plans and established public 
insurance for those plans.131 The Act was prompted, in part, by the closure of a 
major auto manufacturing plant whose pension plan was so poorly funded that 
it left employees without their promised benefits.132 A pension plan governed 
by ERISA can only be terminated under the processes set out in ERISA.133 
Bankruptcy courts have affirmed the provisions in ERISA, reasoning that 
such laws were the exclusive means of terminating a pension plan, and that 
they should apply to a debtor’s bankruptcy estate as well.134 ERISA law 
 
 126 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A). ERISA does not govern healthcare benefits, life insurance, or other retirement 
benefits. Id. This paper will not address these employee benefits in the municipal bankruptcy process. These 
obligations are, however, certainly important factors in municipal debt. See John Ouellette, Panel, Reports 
Call for Health and Pension Reforms, MASS. MUN. ASSOC. (May 7, 2010), http://www.mma.org/local-aid-and-
finance/4611-panel-reports-call-for-health-and-pension-reforms (citing cities’ rising health care expenditures 
and the need for reform). However, state laws guaranteeing public pension benefits do not usually extend to 
other retirement benefits, and municipalities can modify these benefits, even for vested retirees, without the 
same legal restrictions. See, e.g., Lippman v. Bd. of Educ., 487 N.E.2d 897, 898 (N.Y. 1985) (holding that 
Article V, Section 7 of the New York Constitution, which protects pension benefits as contractual rights, does 
not extend to health insurance benefits). Additionally, these other retirement benefits are treated differently 
than pensions under bankruptcy law. See 11 U.S.C. § 1114(a). 
 127 29 U.S.C. § 1002(35). 
 128 Daniel Keating, Chapter 11’s New Ten-Ton Monster: The PBGC and Bankruptcy, 77 MINN. L. REV. 
803, 805 (1993). 
 129 Deering v. Deering, 437 A.2d 883, 885 n.3 (Md. 1981). 
 130 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1). 
 131 Andrew Stumpff, Darkness at Noon: Judicial Interpretations May Have Made Things Worse For 
Benefit Plan Participants Under ERISA Than Had the Statute Never Been Enacted, in ERISA LITIGATION 
2010, at 249, 257 (PLI Litigation & Admin. Practice, Handbook Ser. No. 831, 2010). 
 132 Id. (citing JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: A 
POLITICAL HISTORY 51–79 (2004)).  
 133 29 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). 
 134 See In re Phillip Servs. Corp., 310 B.R. 802, 809 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2004) (stating that, in a bankruptcy 
case, “[t]he statute starts with the statement that the ERISA termination provisions are the [e]xclusive means of 
plan termination”); see also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Pritchard (In re Esco Mfg. Co.), 50 F.3d 315, 316 
(5th Cir. 1995) (noting that Congress intended ERISA to “provide the sole and exclusive means under which a 
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provides a structure for termination of a pension in bankruptcy that, among 
other procedural protections, requires the bankruptcy court to approve the 
termination and determine that “unless the plan is terminated, [the debtor] will 
be unable to pay all its debts pursuant to a plan of reorganization and will be 
unable to continue in business outside the chapter 11 reorganization  
process.” 135 
Courts have held that ERISA’s reference to “‘a’ plan of reorganization” 
does not mean that any plan of reorganization that includes a pension 
termination provision is therefore permitted.136 “[R]ather the test is whether the 
debtor can obtain confirmation of any plan of reorganization without 
termination of the retirement plan. The burden of proof for a distress 
termination is on the sponsor of the plan.”137 For example, a bankruptcy court 
held termination necessary under this standard when it found that a company 
that filed for bankruptcy needed to increase profits by 70% in the subsequent 
six months to pay for pension obligations, a goal that the court determined was 
“impossible under current industry conditions.”138 
If a business terminates a pension plan in bankruptcy under ERISA, the 
protections of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) apply.139 The 
PBGC was created to “protect employees against the loss of ‘nonforfeitable’ 
benefits upon termination of pension plans lacking sufficient funds to pay 
benefits in full.”140 The PBGC is funded first by the assets of the terminated 
pension plan141 and then by premiums paid by the insured companies.142 The 
PBGC guarantees a certain percentage of monthly benefits if the plan is 
terminated,143 subject to certain limitations.144 The maximum premium that the 
 
qualified pension plan may be terminated” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 99-300, at 289 (1985), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 756, 940)).  
 135 29 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(ii)(IV). 
 136 In re U.S. Airways Grp., Inc., 296 B.R. 734, 743–44 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003). 
 137 Id. at 744 (citation omitted). 
 138 In re Sewell Mfg. Co., 195 B.R. 180, 186 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996). 
 139 29 U.S.C. § 1322(a). 
 140 Raymond B. Yates, M.D., P.C. Profit Sharing Plan v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 7 (2004).  
 141 29 U.S.C. § 1344. 
 142 Id. § 1306(a); see Nicholas J. Brannick, At the Crossroads of Three Codes: How Employers Are Using 
ERISA, the Tax Code, and Bankruptcy to Evade Their Pension Obligations, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1577, 1581–82 
(2004). 
 143 29 U.S.C. §§ 1322–1323. 
 144 See, e.g., id. § 1322(b)(1) (providing that no benefits provided or increased within five years of the 
plan termination are covered by the PBGC). 
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PBGC will insure is set annually, and for 2010 was capped at $54,000 a year 
for those who retire at age sixty-five.145 
In the case of termination through a bankruptcy proceeding, the PBGC may 
participate in a chapter 11 bankruptcy as a creditor for claims on both the 
amount of any underfunding as well as any unpaid contributions. 146 Because 
pension benefits are paid only upon retirement and only if the pensioner is 
vested, and because they continue to be paid until the pensioner’s death, the 
value of PBGC’s claim rests on a number of actuarial assumptions including 
the life expectancy of the plan’s recipients.147 In addition to this valuation, the 
court must determine the present value of the claim by calculating the discount 
rate for such a claim.148 This reflects the “economic reality that a certain 
amount of money received today is worth more than the same amount of 
money received tomorrow.”149 
B. Priority of Pension Expenses 
Chapter 11 provides that payments for retiree benefits such as health and 
life insurance are administrative expenses150 and should be paid in cash to 
those owed on the effective date of the plan of reorganization unless there is an 
agreement otherwise.151 Chapter 11 contains no such explicit provision for 
pensions, however. The general provisions of the Code require that 
administrative expenses be “actual” and “necessary” and that they include only 
wages, salaries, and commissions for services rendered after the 
commencement of the case, among other expenses.152 Courts have evaluated 
whether an expense is actual and necessary under a two part test inquiring 
whether the expense: “(1) . . . arose from a transaction with the bankruptcy 
 
 145 The PBGC guarantees a lesser amount for those who retire at a younger age and a higher amount for 
those who retire at an older age. Press Release, Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., PBGC Announces Maximum Ins. 
Benefit for 2010 (Oct. 27, 2009), available at http://www.pbgc.gov/ news/ press/ releases/pr10-02.html. 
 146 See, e.g., In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 456 F.3d 328, 330 (3d Cir. 2006); see also In re Kent Plastic 
Corp., 183 B.R. 841, 844 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1995); In re Columbia Packing Co., 47 B.R. 126, 128 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 1985). This does not mean that the PBGC is eligible, however, to pursue in bankruptcy proceedings the 
$1250 per plan member termination premium that employers are required to pay for three years after certain 
terminations. See 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(7)(A). The Second Circuit has held that these termination premiums are 
not prepetition claims. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Oneida Ltd., 562 F.3d 154, 158 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 147 Daniel Keating, supra note 128, at 818.  
 148 2 NORTON, supra note 52, § 48.11. 
 149 In re Lowen Grp. Int’l, Inc., 274 B.R. 427, 434 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002). 
 150 11 U.S.C. § 1114(e)(2) (2006). 
 151 Id. § 1129(a)(9). 
 152 Id. § 503(b)(1)(a). 
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estate and (2) . . . directly and substantially benefitted the estate.”153 Courts 
have held that obligations for pension plan contributions for work performed 
prepetition, even if they are due postpetition, could not be treated as an 
administrative priority.154 Therefore, claims for pension contributions either (a) 
owed prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition or (b) owed after the filing 
for work performed prior to the filing are typically treated as general unsecured 
claims.155 Presumably, pension obligations due after the filing of the 
bankruptcy for work also performed after the filing of the bankruptcy would be 
an allowable administrative expense. 
C. Collective Bargaining Protections in Chapter 11 
Pensions that are included in a collective bargaining agreement are subject 
to further procedural protections under the Code.156 The Supreme Court in 
National Labor Relations Board v. Bildisco & Bidisco held that a debtor in 
possession could reject a collective bargaining agreement only if the “equities 
balance in favor of [rejection]”157 but that such rejection could take place 
unilaterally without the otherwise required collective bargaining.158 The 
Supreme Court reasoned that the special nature of collective bargaining 
agreements required the Court to impose a stricter test than the “business 
judgment test” usually used in rejecting executory contracts.159 
While the Supreme Court in Bildisco resolved a conflict among the 
circuits,160 this holding sparked debate in Congress, and within five months of 
the Court’s decision, Congress passed an amendment to the Code.161 The new 
§ 1113 provided prerequisites for the rejection of collective bargaining 
 
 153 McMillan v. LTV Steel, Inc. 555 F.3d 218, 226 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting In re Eagle-Picher Indus., 
Inc., 447 F.3d 461, 464 (6th Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 154 In re A.C.E. Elevator Co., Inc., 347 B.R. 473, 480 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing In re Finley, 
Kumble, 160 B.R. 882, 887–91 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993)). 
 155 11 U.S.C. § 507. 
 156 Id. § 1113. 
 157 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 526 (1984), partially superseded by statute, Bankruptcy 
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 376. 
 158 See Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp. Inc, 816 F. 2d 82, 87 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Bildisco, 
465 U.S. at 534). 
 159 Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 524. 
 160 See In re Carey Transp., Inc., 50 B.R. 203, 205 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
 161 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 541(a), 98 Stat. 
376, 390; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (the Code section that Congress enacted in response to Bildisco); Century 
Brass Prods., Inc. v. UAW Local 1604 (In re Century Brass Prods., Inc.), 795 F.2d 265, 273 (2d Cir. 1986) 
(describing the passage of 11 U.S.C. § 1113). 
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agreements and established standards a judge should use in granting the 
rejection of such agreements.162 Under this revision, a debtor in possession 
must make a submission to the union proposing the modification of benefits 
and provide the information necessary for the union to evaluate the proposal 
prior to seeking rejection of the collective bargaining agreement with the 
court.163 Such modifications must be “necessary to permit the reorganization” 
and must assure that “all creditors, the debtor and all of the affected parties are 
treated fairly and equitably.”164 Thereafter, the trustee must negotiate in good 
faith with the union.165 The court will not approve the debtor’s rejection of the 
collective bargaining agreement unless and until the court determines that the 
union has failed to accept the debtor’s proposal without good cause and that 
“the balance of the equities clearly favors rejection of such an agreement.”166 
Courts have adopted conflicting opinions on the necessity that justifies the 
rejection of the collective bargaining agreement.167 Some courts have 
interpreted “necessity” to mean “essential” to the reorganization.168 Others 
have interpreted “’necessity’” as placing on the debtor the “burden of proving 
that its proposal is made in good faith, and that it contains necessary, but not 
absolutely minimal, changes that will enable the debtor to complete the 
reorganization process successfully.”169 Several have argued these two 
interpretations have become indistinguishable, and for practical purposes, 
those courts have applied § 1113 with the lower threshold.170 While § 1113 
may appear pro-debtor on its face, research conducted after the passage of 
§ 1113 suggests that these provisions are in fact more favorable to unions than 
the standards implemented in Bildisco.171 
One might debate whether the standards for termination under the Code are 
significantly different from the standards the Supreme Court laid out in 
 
 162 11 U.S.C. § 1113; 5 NORTON, supra note 52, § 104:6. 
 163 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1). 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. § 1113(b)(2). 
 166 Id. § 1113(c). 
 167 See Truck Drivers Local 807 v. Carey Transp. Inc, 816 F.2d 82, 88–89 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 168 See id. at 89 (citing Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 791 F.2d 1074, 1088 (3d 
Cir. 1986)). 
 169 See id. at 90. 
 170 See Andrew B. Dawson, Collective Bargaining Agreements in Corporate Reorganizations, 84 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 103, 113 (2010). 
 171 A study showed debtors were able to reject their collective bargaining agreements in 58% of all cases 
between 1984 and 1993, after the passage of § 1113, compared to 67% of the cases prior to 1984, suggesting 
that the protections in § 1113 provided a real, though perhaps modest, impact. See id.  
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Bildisco;172 however, the process for rejection under the Code173 is certainly 
more stringent.174 In addition to carefully delineated bargaining requirements, 
175 § 1113 also requires an expedited time frame for review, including a 
hearing within fourteen days after the debtor files an application to reject a 
collective bargaining agreement176 and a ruling by the court thirty days 
thereafter.177 
The insurance of pensions through the PBGC, the regulation of pensions 
under ERISA,178 and the collective bargaining and prioritization provisions in 
chapter 11179 are examples of federal law setting protections for pensioners and 
processes through which employers manage pension obligations. Since chapter 
11 and ERISA do not apply to government pension plans, one must look to 
state pension laws and chapter 9 to determine what protections and processes 
are available for government pensioners and municipalities. 
III.  STATE LAW PENSION PROTECTIONS 
A. State Pension Laws 
State laws protecting pensions180 are the biggest limitations to a 
municipality reducing or avoiding existing pension obligations. Because 
ERISA does not apply to governmental pension plans,181 they are subject only 
to state regulations on funding182 and structure.183 
 
 172 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)(3) (2006) (stating that the court must consider “the balance of the 
equities”), with NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 526 (1984) (“[T]he Bankruptcy Court should 
permit rejection of a collective-bargaining agreement . . . if the debtor can show that the collective-bargaining 
agreement burdens the estate, and that after careful scrutiny, the equities balance in favor of rejecting the labor 
contract.”), partially superseded by statute, Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. 
L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 376. 
 173 11 U.S.C. § 1113. 
 174 Omer Kimhi, Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON 
REG. 351, 358 (2010) (“The Bildisco decision offers a relatively lenient standard for the rejection of CBAs, 
because as opposed to [§] 1113, under Bildisco the court does not need to inject itself into the negotiations and 
evaluate the reasonableness of the debtor’s proposals.”). 
 175 11 U.S.C. § 1113(b)(1), (c)(1)–(2). 
 176 Id. § 1113(d)(1). 
 177 Id. § 1113(d)(2). 
 178 Stumpff, supra note 131, at 249, 257. 
 179 11 U.S.C. § 1113. 
 180 See, e.g., Navlet v. Port of Seattle, 194 P.3d 221, 232 (Wash. 2008) (en banc). 
 181 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1). 
 182 See, e.g., 53 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 895.302(c), 895.303(c) (West 2011). 
 183 See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7507.5 (West 2011). 
HECK GALLEYSFINAL2 12/16/20118:33 AM 
2011] SOLVING INSOLVENT PUBLIC PENSIONS 111 
Municipal governments fund employee pensions in a number of ways. In 
many instances, municipalities contribute to a pension trust fund that is 
responsible for both investing the money and paying claims.184 Sometimes this 
trust fund is pooled with other municipal employers or with the state.185 
Alternatively, because the requirement for nongovernmental entities to utilize 
pension trusts under ERISA does not apply to municipalities, 186 the pension 
obligations may be paid directly to pensioners by municipalities from their 
general budget on a “pay-as-you-go” basis.187 
Most state laws set strict statutory and constitutional limits on changes to or 
reductions of pension benefits.188 There are several general models for such 
restrictions.189 In many states, a vested public pension is viewed as a 
contractual right.190 Under this model, there are state due process concerns 
with modifying pension obligations,191 and pensions can only be altered under 
a state and federal constitutional Contracts Clause analysis.192 Additionally, 
several states that view a pension as a contractual right, including California, 
allow changes to the pension plan only if any reductions can be offset by a new 
benefit of equal or greater value.193 This is the so-called “California rule.” 194 
 
 184 See, e.g., PITTSBURGH, PA., CODE ORDINANCES tit. 1, art. IX, ch. 176 (1986). 
 185 See, e.g., Objection by California Public Employees’ Retirement System of the City of Vallejo’s 
Motion for Approval of Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements at 2, In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72 
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009) (No. 08-26813-A-9) (noting that the City of Vallejo contributed to a state-wide 
retirement system for their municipal employees).  
 186 29 U.S.C. § 1103. 
 187 Jonathan Barry Forman, Funding Public Pension Plans, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 837, 841–42 (2009) 
(explaining that, though ERISA does not apply to local government pensions and the laws allow for “pay-as-
you-go” plans, accounting standards set for municipalities by the Government Accounting Standards Board 
(GASB) have made many municipalities pre-fund pension obligations, though likely less than 100% funding). 
 188 3 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 12.141 (3d ed. 1978). 
 189 See, e.g., Marvel v. Dannemann, 490 F. Supp. 170, 173 (D. Del. 1980) (holding that pension was a 
contractual right); see also State v. McMillan, 319 S.E.2d 1, 7 (Ga. 1984) (holding that pension was a property 
right); Maffei v. Sacramento Cnty. Employees’ Ret. Sys., 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 279, 284 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) 
(holding reductions in pension plan benefits must be offset by comparable benefits). 
 190 See, e.g., Marvel, 490 F. Supp. at 173; Fund Manager, Pub. Safety Pers. Ret. Sys. v. City of Phx. 
Police Dep’t Pub. Safety Pers. Ret. Sys. Bd., 728 P.2d 1237, 1239, 1241 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986). 
 191 See, e.g., Cal. Ass’n of Prof’l Scientists v. Schwarzenegger, 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 354, 361 n.5 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2006) (“The [C]ontract [C]lause of the federal Constitution (art. I, § 10) prohibits any state from passing 
a law ‘impairing the obligations of contracts.’ . . . The California Constitution similarly provides that  
‘[a] . . . law impairing the obligation of contracts may not be passed.’” (citation omitted) (quoting CAL. CONST. 
art. I, § 9; Lyon v. Flournoy, 76 Cal. Rptr. 869, 873 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969))). 
 192 See, e.g., Fund Manager, Pub. Safety Pers. Ret. Sys., 728 P.2d at 1240 (evaluating whether a change in 
an accidental disability pension benefit was legal and holding “[t]he state’s power to modify contracts is 
limited, however, by the [C]ontract [C]lause of the Arizona Constitution and the United States Constitution”). 
 193 See, e.g., Maffei, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 284; Olson v. Cory, 636 P.2d 532, 541 (Cal. 1980). 
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In other states, such as Georgia, a pension is viewed as a property interest of 
the pensioner, and such interest cannot be reduced without due process.195 In 
still other states, such as Michigan, rights of pension members are explicitly 
protected in the state constitution.196 This constitutional protection usually bars 
the public employer from reducing or modifying the benefits of pension 
members other than for prospective members.197 
Many state laws prohibit changing a pension benefit for any worker that 
has completed any portion of service (i.e., for anyone other than newly hired 
employees). 198 Under Georgia law, for example, even if the employee is not 
technically vested in the retirement plan, his or her rights to the retirement plan 
are “constitutionally vested.”199 This means that, if a pension plan in Georgia 
requires fifteen years of service for the pensioner to vest in the pension plan 
and thus to be eligible to retire with some portion of the promised pension 
benefits, a pensioner with less than fifteen years would nonetheless still be 
protected from any amendments to the pension plan that would reduce the 
employee’s pension benefits even prior to completion of the fifteen-year term 
of service.200 
B. State Labor Laws 
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) governs organized labor in the 
United States, but it does not apply to government employers.201 Therefore, the 
state law governing labor relations is the binding law for municipal 
 
 194 See Betts v. Bd. of Admin., 582 P.2d 614, 617 (Cal. 1978); see also Jeffery B. Ellman & Daniel J. 
Merrett, Pensions and Chapter 9: Can Municipalities Use Bankruptcy to Solve Their Pension Woes?, 27 
EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 365, 380–81 (2011). 
 195 See State v. McMillan, 319 S.E.2d 1, 7 (Ga. 1984); see also In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Erickson, 556 N.W.2d 99 (Wis. 1996); Pineman v. Oechslin, 488 A.2d 803, 808–09 (Conn. 1985); Withers v. 
Register, 269 S.E.2d 431, 432–33 (Ga. 1980). 
 196 MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24 (“The accrued financial benefits of each pension plan and retirement 
system of the state and its political subdivisions shall be a contractual obligation thereof which shall not be 
diminished or impaired thereby.”); see also ALASKA CONST. art. XII, § 7; 60 AM. JUR. 2D Pensions § 1176 
(2003). 
 197 See Withers, 269 S.E.2d at 432–33. 
 198 See, e.g., id. (“[I]f the employee contributes at any time any amount toward the benefits he is to 
receive, and if the employee performs services while the law is in effect; and that the impairment clause of our 
constitution (Art. I, Sec. I, Par. VII, Constitution of Georgia of 1976; Code Ann. § 2-107) precludes the 
application of an amendatory statute or ordinance in the calculation of the employee’s retirement benefits if the 
effect of the amendment is to reduce rather than increase the benefits payable.”) 
 199 See id. 
 200 See id. 
 201 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2006). 
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employers.202 In states that have municipal workers unions, the provision of 
pension benefits for active employees or the contributions required for pension 
trusts, as well as contributions for retirees,203 are typically included in 
collective bargaining agreements.204 
IV.  CURRENT SOLUTIONS FOR THE MUNICIPAL PENSION PROBLEM 
A. State-Authorized Local Tools 
A municipality that is having difficulty meeting its pension obligations, or 
that is having difficulty paying its operating expenses because of the 
obligations from its pensions, has few options given the pension rights of both 
current and retired employees.205 Even under the most restrictive of state law 
schemes, however, municipalities are able to change pension benefits for 
employees hired in the future.206 In fact, many state and local governments 
have responded to pension pressures in recent years by changing the terms of 
retirement benefits for newly hired employees.207 This can and has been done 
by raising the retirement age, reducing benefits, or converting wholesale into a 
defined contribution208 or a 401(k)-like plan, but such changes are only 
applicable to new prospective employees.209 However, because the payouts for 
 
 202 See, e.g., Public Employment Relations Act, ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.070–.260 (West 2011); see also 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 423.201–.216 (West 2011); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 243.650 (West 2011). 
 203 See, e.g., Rabinowitz v. City of Hartford, No. CV075008403S, 2010 WL 4075425, at *1 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. Sept. 30, 2010) (involving action by retirees against the city for the proper payment of retiree pensions 
according to the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement). 
 204 See, e.g., Navlet v. Port of Seattle, 194 P.3d 221, 225 (Wash. 2008) (en banc) (describing the collective 
bargaining terms that require the union to contribute into the pension trust). 
 205 See, e.g., id. at 232 (citing Abels v. Snohomish Cnty. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 849 P.2d 1258 (1993)); see 
also Police Pension Fund Ass’n Bd. v. Hess, 562 A.2d 391 (Pa. 1989). 
 206 See Withers v. Register, 269 S.E.2d 431, 432–33 (Ga. 1980).  
 207 See, e.g. Alicia Robinson, RIVERSIDE: Lower Pension Tier Formalized, PRESS ENTERPRISE, Sept. 22, 
2011, http://www.pe.com/local-news/riverside-county/riverside/riverside-headlines-index/20110923-riverside-
lower-pension-tier-formalized.ece (reporting increases in pension contributions and decreases in pension 
benefits for new hires); see also Randall Jensen, San Diego Ahead in Pension Reform, BOND BUYER, Jan. 7, 
2011, http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/120_5/san_diego_pension-1021855-1.html (explaining how San 
Diego has decreased pension benefits for new hires). 
 208 70 C.J.S. Pensions § 24 (2005) (“An individual account plan or defined contribution plan is a pension 
plan which provides for an individual account for each participant and for benefits based solely upon the 
amount contributed to the participant’s account, and any income, expenses, gains, and losses and any 
forfeitures of other participants which may be allocated to the account.”).  
 209 See RONALD SNELL, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, STATE RETIREMENT SYSTEM DEFINED 
CONTRIBUTION PLANS 3–4 (2009), available at http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/employ/ 
StateGovtDCPlansSept2009.pdf. 
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the pensions or other retirement benefits of the newly-hired stretch decades 
into the future, these changes do not significantly aid municipal governments 
in their ability to deal with pension obligations and debt more immediately 
owed. 
A municipality overly burdened by pension obligations, yet obligated under 
state law to pay these obligations, can respond in a variety of ways depending 
on the financial status of its annual budget and the financial health of its 
pension fund.210 Generally, municipalities would be required to pay out of 
general funds when pension trust funding is insufficient to pay claims211 or 
meet defined trust or state minimum funding levels.212 Where authorized by 
state law, a municipality might also sell pension bonds to pay for the 
liability.213 As an increasing portion of a municipality’s operating budget goes 
towards funding pension obligations, this can frustrate the municipality’s 
ability to meet its municipal service mandates and to make payments for other 
debt obligations. 214 
A municipality with a distressed budget might be unable to make payments 
out of general funds as political pressures could keep it from dedicating 
general tax revenues to pension obligations. In certain instances, when a 
pension trust has available funds, local governments have liquidated pension 
trust fund assets or reserves to pay their more immediate pension 
 
 210 See, e.g., Kenneth Lowe, Decatur Public Library Continues to Feel Squeeze of Tight Budget, HERALD-
REVIEW, Dec. 16, 2010, http://www.herald-review.com/news/local/article_2eb4df60-fbd7-5e96-b646-
9d3fd84130b1.html (describing how the city enacted deep cuts to public library to fund increasing pension 
costs); Michael McDonald & Adam L. Cataldo, ‘Dumbest Idea Ever’ Used as Pensions Plug Deficit (Update 
2), BLOOMBERG, May 1, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=arYeVtZeBd4s 
(stating that Philadelphia Mayor Edward Rendell sold $1.29 billion in pension bonds in 1999 and a later 
governor then stopped making contributions to the pension fund to balance the budget). 
 211 See, e.g., Westly v. Cal. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. Bd. of Admin., 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 149, 155 n.7 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2003) (noting that provisions protecting the state pension fund were passed in part to protect tax 
increases which would result if funds were mismanaged). 
 212 See, e.g., Municipal Pension Plan Funding Standard and Recovery Act, 53 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§§ 895.101–.1131 (2009).  
 213 See, e.g., Mary Williams Walsh & Michael Cooper, Illinois Pension Bonds to Test Investors’ Faith, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/18/business/18illinois.html (“Illinois hopes to 
sell $3.7 billion of bonds to make this year’s contribution to its fund. It is essentially paying a single year’s bill 
by adding to its already heavy debt load.”); Spadoro v. Whitman, 695 A.2d 654, 655 (N.J. 1997) (upholding 
the constitutionality of New Jersey’s Pension Bond Financing Act of 1997).  
 214 See, e.g., Tom Barrett, Mayor, City of Milwaukee, Proposed Executive Budget Speech, p. 2–3 (Sept. 
23, 2010) available at http://www.ci.mil.wi.us/ImageLibrary/Groups/MayorAuthors/2010/budget/ 
1009232010BudgetAddress.pdf (announcing his intention to pay the $49 million pension obligation out of 
general funds, which required that the city cut more than $31 million in operating spending and that the city 
eliminate 360 full-time equivalent positions). 
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obligations.215 In Chicago, Illinois, for example, where unfunded pension 
liabilities were estimated to be $41,966 per city household,216 city officials 
announced a plan to sell pension assets to meet the city’s 2010 pension 
obligations.217 While asset liquidation is certainly a short-term solution to fund 
current pension obligations, unless the trust assets can sustain a municipality 
until revenues increase or expenses decrease (for example, until the benefits of 
pension changes for newly hired employees are reaped by the municipality), 
the effectiveness of this strategy is likely to be short-lived. Ultimately, a 
municipality might be required to draw from general funds in the future if the 
pension assets fall short. 
As an alternative to selling pension assets, or as a strategy used in 
conjunction with selling pension assets, a state may increase the contributions 
of current employees to pay for retiree expenses.218 This “pay-as-you-go” 
model emulates the Federal Government’s Social Security program, where 
deductions from the paychecks of today’s workers are paying for the benefits 
of today’s retirees.219 However, this funding strategy in the Social Security 
program has been criticized in derisive language as a “giant Ponzi scheme.”220 
Such a strategy for pension funding is also likely to be short sighted because 
the contributions from current employees will likely not keep pace with 
growing retiree obligations.221 Moreover, this strategy may result in political 
pressure from current employees who are disproportionately required to bear 
the costs of pension obligations while simultaneously having reason to doubt 
the viability of the pension trust for their own long-term benefits. 
 
 215 Illinois, Kentucky Forced to Sell Off Pension Assets, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Oct. 7, 2010, http:// 
www.institutionalinvestor.com/pensions_and_endowments/Articles/2683814/Illinois-Kentucky-Forced-To-
Sell-Off-Pension-Assets.html. 
 216 Dire Outcomes Predicted for Municipal Pension Systems, KELLOGG SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT, Oct. 
10, 2010, http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/News_Articles/2010/municipal-pension-systems.aspx (last 
visited Jan. 4, 2011).  
 217 See, e.g., Dardick, supra note 45.  
 218 See, e.g., Jeff Sistrunk & Katie Brenzel, Tax Relief from Pension Reform? Towns Wait and See, NJ 
HERALD, October 8, 2011, http://www.njherald.com/story/news/PENSIONREFORM-1011-web (noting that 
the town increased employee pension contributions by up to 1.5% of employee’s salaries to net a $145,000 
reduction in city pension contributions). 
 219 Gary Burtless, Income and Social Security and Substandard Working Conditions, 51 INDUS. & LAB. 
REL. REV. 528, 529 (1998).  
 220 See Jerry W. Markham, Privatizing Social Security, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 747, 756 n.48 (2001). 
 221 Burtless, supra note 219, at 529 (arguing that increased life spans and decreased fertility rates will 
impact “pay-as-you-go” pension solvency just as it has in Social Security). 
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This toolbox for managing pension obligations has been, and will likely 
continue to be, sufficient to keep most municipalities current on their debt 
obligations.222 However, a municipality that is facing a shrinking tax base or 
the fallout from poor municipal investments,223 and growing pension debts, 
may have its ability to provide basic municipal services threatened by its need 
to pay debt obligations or simply be unable to pay debts. Some states allow for 
a process of state court receivership or some comparable alternative in the case 
of an insolvent municipality.224 Additionally, in practice, many states have 
come to the financial aid of municipalities teetering on the verge of 
bankruptcy, choosing to spend state dollars rather than allowing municipal 
bond defaults within their borders.225 
B. A State-Authorized Federal Solution: Chapter 9 
A municipality’s financial burdens may limit the effectiveness of these 
tools, and a state may be unable or unwilling to “bail out” these local 
governments. In many states, the same factors that have led to municipal 
insolvency—reduction in both tax revenues and federal aid coupled with 
increased legacy obligations—have also put states in a precarious position.226 
Even in states that are able to come to the aid of municipalities, there might be 
 
 222 This is evidenced by the fact that there have been only roughly forty general-purpose municipal 
bankruptcy filings from 1976 to January 2009. Kimhi, supra note 174, at 359.  
 223 See, e.g., Cnty. of Orange v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Cnty. of Orange), 241 B.R. 212, 214 (Bankr. 
C.D. Cal. 1999) (“In 1994, Orange County, California, filed the largest municipal bankruptcy in history after 
failure of a risky leveraged investment scheme by its Treasurer.”). 
 224 Forrest, supra note at 83 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-9-1 (West 2011)) (discussing a Rhode Island 
state law that requires a fiscal overseer and other requirements in the case of a municipal fiscal emergency).  
 225 See, e.g., Press Release, Pennsylvania Office of the Governor, Commonwealth Partnering With City of 
Harrisburg To Help It Meet Immediate Financial Obligations (Sept. 12, 2010) (on file with author) 
(announcing that the State of Pennsylvania would provide $4.3 million in economic assistance to the city of 
Harrisburg to help the city pay an upcoming bond payment as well as pay for a financial management firm to 
craft a plan to help the city out of debt after previously announcing that they would be unable to make a 
general obligation bond payments).  
 226 NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, ISSUE BRIEF: STATE GOVERNMENT REDESIGN EFFORTS 2009 AND 2010 
(2010) (reporting “record budget shortfalls over the past several years,” with fiscal year 2010 expenditures 
down to $612.9 billion from $687.3 billion in fiscal year 2008 and that states have implemented many budget 
cuts and programmatic changes adjusting to what may be “the new normal”). 
HECK GALLEYSFINAL2 12/16/20118:33 AM 
2011] SOLVING INSOLVENT PUBLIC PENSIONS 117 
a resistance to do so for fear of the “moral hazard”227 inherent in such an 
action.228 
There are thus limited choices to manage municipal pension debt under 
state regimes. Many of the federal law “protections” for employee benefits and 
compensation (e.g., ERISA, NLRA) defer to state law for governmental 
entities,229 and many state and municipal laws restrict modification or 
termination of pension benefits230 and unilateral modification of labor 
agreements in states with public labor unions.231 However, federal bankruptcy 
law, where authorized by state law,232 gives a municipality tools they would 
not traditionally have under the above-mentioned state law and constitutional 
limitations.233  
Few municipalities to date have utilized chapter 9 to terminate a pension 
trust or modify existing pension obligations,234 but the definitions in the Code 
would certainly accommodate the inclusion of such debt.235 The Code defines 
the term “claim” as a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to 
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, 
disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.”236 This broad 
definition would likely encompass pension obligations owed to pensioners and 
would give the pensioners standing like any creditor.237 
 
 227 OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, SIG-GR-09-04, 
QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 3 (2009), available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/2009/ 
October2009_Quarterly_Report_to_Congress.pdf (defining moral hazard as “the lack of incentive individuals 
have to guard against a risk when they are protected against that risk”). 
 228 Similar arguments were made regarding the government’s bailout of AIG and GM. See, e.g., Ann 
Graham, Bringing to Heel the Elephants in the Economy: The Case For Ending “Too Big To Fail,” 8 PIERCE 
L. REV. 117, 151 (2010) (“[I]t is the expectation of continued government bailouts that creates the most serious 
cases of moral hazard and distorted resource allocation.”). 
 229 See 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1); see also id. § 152(2). 
 230 See ALASKA CONST. art. XII, § 7; MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24 (“The accrued financial benefits of each 
pension plan and retirement system of the state and its political subdivisions shall be a contractual obligation 
thereof which shall not be diminished or impaired thereby.”); Withers v. Register, 269 S.E.2d 431, 432 (Ga. 
1980); Pensions, supra note 196, § 1176. 
 231 See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3515.7 (West 2011); City of Vallejo Charter, art. 7, § 809. 
 232 11 U.S.C. § 109(c). 
 233 See Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 589 (1935) (“[U]nder the bankruptcy 
power Congress may discharge the debtor’s personal obligation, because, unlike the states, it is not prohibited 
from impairing the obligations of contracts.”). 
 234 See Ellman & Merrett, supra note 194, at 411.  
 235 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(a). 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id. § 943 (stating the requirements for plan confirmation in chapter 9). 
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1. The Insolvency Requirement 
The Code insolvency requirement serves as a “gatekeeper” by discouraging 
superfluous filings.238 The Code defines municipal insolvency in two ways: 
“(i) generally not paying . . . debts as they become due unless such debts are 
the subject of a bona fide dispute; or (ii) unable to pay . . . debts as they 
become due.” 239 A mere budget deficit would probably not be sufficient to 
meet these criteria,240 but instead the court would likely conduct a cash flow 
analysis to determine if debts could be paid as they come due.241 As part of this 
analysis, the court might look to see if there are available cash reserves.242 In 
In re Bridgeport, the court held that the city did not meet the definition of 
insolvency because the city had not drawn down monies from a contingency 
fund that would enable the city, if spent, to meet its budget for that year.243 
It is important to note that bond defaults alone may not suggest municipal 
insolvency. For example, a revenue bond, a type of special obligation bond, is 
payable “from the income of utilities or projects erected or constructed with 
the proceeds of the bond issue.”244 Therefore, because the revenue bond holder 
has no claim on municipal tax revenue,245 the default on these special 
obligation bonds would not bind a city’s general revenues and would not 
impact a city’s ability to pay any other debts as they become due. Such bonds 
can be contrasted with general obligation bonds that are “payable from and 
secured by a pledge of the issuers taxing power.”246 The default of general 
obligation bonds would most likely indicate insolvency, unless, as in 
 
 238 McConnell & Picker, supra note 54, 456.  
 239 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(c). 
 240 See In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 337 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991) (“Section 101(32)(C)(ii) 
defines insolvency by whether Bridgeport will be able to ‘pay its debts as they become due,’ not on whether it 
has a budget gap.”). 
 241 See, e.g., In re Pierce Cnty. Hous. Auth., 414 B.R. 702, 710–11 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009) 
(determining that the test for insolvency is a cash flow rather than a budget deficit analysis); see also Int’l 
Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Vallejo (In re City of Vallejo), 408 B.R. 280, 288 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009) 
(noting the trial court’s finding that the city’s reserves, operational deficit, and cash flow was sufficient to 
show insolvency). 
 242 See, e.g., In re Ellicott Sch. Bldg. Auth., 150 B.R. 261, 265 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992) (stating that the 
debtor was not insolvent because it had the ability to draw down from a reserve fund); see also In re City of 
Vallejo, 408 B.R. at 288 (noting that, because the reserve fund was depleted, the finding of insolvency was 
bolstered).  
 243 In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. at 337.  
 244 15 MCQUILLIN, supra note 188, § 43.14 (citing Steele v. Indus. Dev. Bd., 301 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 
2002)). 
 245 Id. (citing Steele, 301 F.3d at 401). 
 246 64 AM. JUR. 2D Public Securities and Obligations § 13, at 39 (2001). 
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Bridgeport, there were available reserves from which the general obligation 
bond payments could be made.247 
Under the above analysis, it would likely not be sufficient for a 
municipality merely to have an underfunded or even insolvent pension fund. 
Rather, the municipality would need to be either (a) not paying their pensions 
or other debts, as was the case of Prichard, Alabama248 or, more likely, given 
the potential political backlash from such an action, (b) unable to pay their 
pension or other bond or operating obligations in either that fiscal year or in 
the next year, based on an adopted budget.249 
2. Bankruptcy Court Power 
Chapter 9 prevents a bankruptcy court from directing a municipality on 
how to spend its assets.250 One bankruptcy court has interpreted this restriction 
as limiting the court’s involvement in the bankruptcy plan and actions that 
would, in effect, “determine the municipality’s future tax and spending 
decisions.” 251 
While chapter 9 restricts the court from directly mandating how the 
municipality should spend assets,252 the Code’s definition of municipal 
insolvency might prompt municipalities to spend their resources or to direct 
property in a certain manner so as to be eligible to file under chapter 9. For 
example, to determine if the municipality was able to pay its debts, the court 
would look for a “tangible reserve fund from which debts could be paid.”253 
Practically speaking, if a municipality were entering bankruptcy to address 
 
 247 See In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. at 337 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(c)); see, e.g., Ellicott, 150 
B.R. at 265 (stating that the debtor was not insolvent because it had the ability to draw down from a reserve 
fund); see also In re City of Vallejo, 408 B.R. at 288 (noting that, because the reserve fund was depleted, the 
finding of insolvency was bolstered). 
 248 Cary Chow & Mike Jernigan, Hearing Set for Prichard Pension Checks, FOX10TV.COM (Mar. 4, 2010, 
10:33 PM), http://www.fox10tv.com/dpp/news/Hearing-set-for-Prichard-pension-checks.  
 249 See In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. at 338. 
 250 11 U.S.C. § 904 (2006) (“Notwithstanding any power of the court, unless the debtor consents or the 
plan so provides, the court may not, by any stay, order, or decree, in the case or otherwise, interfere with (1) 
any of the political or governmental powers of the debtor; (2) any of the property or revenues of the debtor; or 
(3) the debtor’s use or enjoyment of any income-producing property.”).  
 251 See In re Pierce Cnty. Hous. Auth., 414 B.R. 702, 715 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2009). 
 252 11 U.S.C. § 904. 
 253 In re Pierce Cnty., 414 B.R. at 712; see also Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Vallejo (In re City of 
Vallejo), 408 B.R. 280, 288 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the depletion of the reserve fund bolstered 
the finding of insolvency); In re Ellicott Sch. Bldg. Auth., 150 B.R. 261, 265 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992) (finding 
that debtor was not insolvent because it had the ability to draw down from a reserve fund). 
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pension obligations, a municipality would have to draw down on pension trust 
fund assets to pay current pension obligations, as the trust instrument allowed, 
and would have to pay current pension obligations out of general funds if 
pension assets were insufficient. Only if these efforts were insufficient to pay 
current pension obligations would a court be likely to declare a municipality 
“insolvent” under chapter 9.254 
The most obvious initial impact in a chapter 9 proceeding to both the 
pensioner, as a creditor, and the municipality, as a debtor, would likely be the 
automatic stay.255 A stay, in the case of a pension obligation, would pause 
almost any litigation256 that the pensioners would pursue on the basis of state 
law.257 There are a number of statutory exceptions to the stay. However, few if 
any of these would be applicable to an action to enforce a pension.258 This 
leaves pensioners with no legal recourse throughout the progression of the 
bankruptcy other than through the bankruptcy court itself.259 
3. Federal Preemption 
Longstanding federal pre-emption doctrine has held that state law that 
conflicts with federal law is preempted.260 The District Court for the Eastern 
District of California recently enforced this holding in In re City of Vallejo 
within the context of Tenth Amendment concerns of municipal bankruptcy.261 
This ruling has a number of potential impacts in a municipal pension debt 
scenario. 
The court in Vallejo held that the city did not need to follow state law when 
rejecting collective bargaining agreements as executory contracts in chapter 9 
bankruptcy proceedings.262 In Vallejo, a city in California filed for bankruptcy 
and then unilaterally modified the terms of four collective bargaining 
 
 254 In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. at 337; see also In re Ellicott, 150 B.R. at 265 (finding that debtor 
was not insolvent because it had the ability to draw down from a reserve fund). 
 255 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 901. 
 256 See 3 COLLIER, supra note 87, at 362–25. 
 257 Ferrara, supra note 5.
 
 258 11 U.S.C. § 362 (exceptions to the stay include family law matters, criminal law actions and tax 
actions, among others). 
 259 Certainly the political pressures inherent in cutting off a large number of citizens’ income would make 
most cities shy away from this tool. 
 260 Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. City of Vallejo (In re City of Vallejo, CA), 432 B.R. 262, 269 (Bankr. 
E.D. Cal. 2010).  
 261 Id. 
 262 Id. at 270. 
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agreements.263 The City of Vallejo then sought to have these rejected under the 
Code.264 Several unions failed to reach an agreement with the city and 
subsequently challenged the rejection of these contracts, arguing that the city 
should have followed applicable California labor laws.265 
While some commentators had previously thought that state law would 
trump bankruptcy law in the collective bargaining context, given chapter 9’s 
deference to states,266 the court in Vallejo sided with the city, reasoning that the 
state statute authorizing municipal bankruptcy did not in any way limit the 
rejection of employee contracts as a precondition267 to seeking federal relief.268 
The court affirmed its previous holding in In re County of Orange, stating that 
“[a] state’s authorization that its municipalities may seek chapter 9 relief is a 
declaration of state policy that the benefits of chapter 9 take precedence over 
control of its municipalities.”269 
The court noted that the procedure for rejection of a collective bargaining 
agreement was not incorporated into chapter 9.270 Therefore, the Supreme 
Court’s Bildisco standard should be followed for rejection of a collective 
bargaining agreement in municipal bankruptcy.271 Collective bargaining 
agreements then, under municipal bankruptcy, are not subject to either state 
labor law or the § 1113 protections. 
While some commentators272 and local officials273 have argued that state 
law restrictions on pension reduction or modifications may limit the 
 
 263 Id. at 265 (discussing the fact that the City of Vallejo sought to reject contracts under § 365). 
 264 Id. 
 265 Id. at 265–66. 
 266 McConnell & Picker, supra note 54, at 468. 
 267 Note that the court uses the term “pre-condition” and not “exception” to chapter 9, presumably because 
under In re County of Orange the court held, “By authorizing the use of [c]hapter 9 by its municipalities, 
California must accept [c]hapter 9 in its totality; it cannot cherry pick what it likes while disregarding the rest.” 
Cnty. of Orange v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Cnty. of Orange), 191 B.R. 1005, 1021 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 
1996). 
 268 In re City of Vallejo, 432 B.R. at 270. 
 269 Id. at 269 (citing In re Cnty. of Orange, 191 B.R. at 1021). 
 270 Id. at 267 (citing § 901 and noting that, because this section did not incorporate § 1113, the collective 
bargaining provision did not apply). 
 271 Id. at 272. 
 272 Girard Miller, Benefits, Bankruptcy and Baloney, GOVERNING MAGAZINE, July 8, 2010, available at 
http://www.governing.com/columns/public-money/state-retiree-Benefits-Bankruptcy-and-Baloney.html 
(arguing that cities with provisions restricting the alteration of pension benefits in statute would have an easier 
time modifying these benefits in bankruptcy than would cities in states where benefits were protected in the 
state’s constitution). 
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bankruptcy court’s ability to reduce or terminate these retirement obligations, 
the court in Vallejo affirmed the general proposition that, where states 
authorize a municipality to file bankruptcy, federal bankruptcy law is not 
subordinate to state law.274 Although the California Code authorized cities to 
invoke municipal bankruptcy,275 other provisions conflicted with municipal 
bankruptcy law. 276 
4. Collective Bargaining Agreements and Executory Contracts 
How a retiree’s claim for a pension is treated in bankruptcy depends, in 
large part, on the court’s interpretation of the Code, as well as the origin of the 
grant of the employee pension (i.e., whether they were given a pension under a 
collective bargaining agreement or employment contract). In the case of a 
pension benefit included in the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, the 
obligation could be rejected with the bankruptcy court’s approval utilizing the 
Supreme Court’s Bildisco standards.277 After such a rejection, the public 
pensioners would then become creditors with claims of damages for the 
discharged contract obligations.278 
Whether the pensions for those retirees who have vested benefits or who 
are already retired would be eligible for rejection hinges on the definition of 
“executory.”279 Congress avoided any attempt to adopt a concrete definition for 
the term executory.280 The courts have utilized different approaches in defining 
“executory.”281 As mentioned above, many courts have adopted the 
 
 273 Jan Goldsmith, San Diego Bankruptcy Talk is Nonsense, SIGN ON SAN DIEGO (Nov. 14, 2010, 12:00 
AM), http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2010/nov/14/san-diego-bankruptcy-talk-nonsense/. 
 274 In re City of Vallejo, 432 B.R. at 270 (“[T]he city is permitted to reject the IBEW CBA as part of its 
[c]hapter 9 bankruptcy reorganization without limitation by state labor law.”). 
 275 Id. at 268 (citing CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53760 (West 2011)). 
 276 Id. at 271 (citing CAL. GOV’T CODE § 3500 (West 2011)). 
 277 Id. at 272. 
 278 11 U.S.C. § 365(o) (2006); see, e.g., Order Approving Stipulation and for Rejection of Collective 
Bargaining Agreement, In re City of Vallejo, 403 B.R. 72 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2009) (No. 2008-26813). 
 279 11 U.S.C. § 365. 
 280 Heiman, supra note 107, at 228.  
 281 See, e.g., In re Surfside Resort & Suites, 344 B.R. 179, 186 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006) (determining 
whether a contract is executory is based on “benefits that assumption or rejection would produce for the 
estate”); see also Sharon Steel Corp. v. Nat’l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 872 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1989) (noting 
that prior courts looked to legislative history to define an executory contract as a “contract on which 
performance remains due on both sides” (citing NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 526 (1984), 
partially superseded by statute, Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
353, 98 Stat. 376)).  
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Countryman definition, requiring that both parties have outstanding obligations 
under the contract to consider a contract “executory.”282 
A minority of courts,283 however, have adopted a functional definition of 
executory contracts, looking to the purposes for which § 365 (dealing with the 
assumption and rejection of executory contracts) was passed and even 
approving rejections in cases in which one side argued completion of its duties 
under the contract.284 Typically, something in addition to payment by one party 
must be due by the terms of the contract to consider a contract executory. 
Otherwise, the party owed money under the contract is merely a creditor and is 
treated accordingly.285 There may be an argument that a pension agreement 
between a pensioner and a municipality is an executory contract if pension 
benefits are conditioned on an employee avoiding certain behavior, and thus, 
benefits are subject to divestment.286 For example, a municipal pension may 
provide for divestment if a pensioner is convicted on criminal charges.287 
Pension benefits included as part of an employment or other type of 
contract would likely not be considered “executory” for retired or vested288 
pensioners since the action owed by the pensioner—employment in the service 
of the municipality—is completed and all that is owed by the government is 
payment of the pension.289 In a case involving pension obligations owed to 
retired or vested pensioners, the bankruptcy court would most likely not allow 
the municipality to reject these pension agreements as executory contracts. 
 
 282 Heiman, supra note 107, at 228.  
 283 Ellman & Merrett, supra note 194, at 392–93.  
 284 See, e.g., In re Surfside Resort & Suites, 344 B.R. at 186 (determining “whether a contract is executory 
is based on ‘benefits that assumption or rejection would produce for the estate’” (quoting Sipes v. Atl. Gulf 
Cmtys. Corp. (In re Gen. Dev. Corp.), 84 F.3d 1364, 1375 (11th Cir. 1996))). 
 285 See Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 522 n.6 (defining the term executory contract as one “‘on which performance 
is due to some extent on both sides’” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 347 (1977), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6303)); see also In re Norquist, 43 B.R. 224, 228 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1984). 
 286 But see In re Teligent, Inc. 268 B.R. 723, 729 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding that the contract was 
executory even though it contained a non-compete clause). 
 287 See, e.g., 43 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1311–1315 (West 2011) (denying pension benefits to public 
employees and elected officials who plead guilty or are convicted of certain crimes).  
 288 See Mascio v. Pub. Emps. Retirement Sys. of Ohio, 160 F.3d 310, 313 (6th Cir. 1998) (explaining that 
the term “vested” means that the pensioner has fulfilled conditions that give the pensioner a right to the 
pension that “cannot afterwards be impaired or revoked”). This can be contrasted with a retired employee, for 
example, because a retirement system might require ten years of service for the employee to “vest” in the 
system but only give benefits upon the employee’s reaching the age of sixty. An employee after ten years of 
service is said to “vest” in the retirement system even though they might continue to work for the employer or 
leave to work for another. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN., § 47-3-129(a) (West 2011). 
 289 See Executory Labor Contracts and Municipal Bankruptcy, 85 YALE L.J. 957, 964–65 n.43 (1976). 
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Instead, the court would likely view pension obligations as any other current 
financial obligation, and pensioners would be analogous to creditors with a 
claim for the value of the unfunded pension obligations.290 Even if the court 
allowed the municipality to reject a pension obligation as an executory 
contract, the pensioners would have a claim for damages against the 
municipality as creditors291 and, therefore, would enjoy the same rights, and 
the municipality would be subject to the same obligations, regardless of how 
the court classified the obligation. 
5. Claim Amount 
Assuming that the bankruptcy court allowed municipal retirees, pension 
funds, or other relevant creditors to make claims for municipal pension 
obligations, the court would then need to determine the amount of the 
claims.292 Determining the claim value for unpaid, past-due pension 
obligations would be more certain, but the bankruptcy court would most likely 
need to rely upon actuarial tables293 to determine the claim value for future 
pension obligations294 and would discount the claim amount to reflect its 
present value.295 In chapter 11 cases, the PBGC, as the ultimate insurer of 
municipal pensions, brings both valuation expertise and advocacy experience 
concerning the valuation of pension claims.296 A single pensioner acting as a 
creditor or a group of pensioners acting as creditors would not have the 
requisite level of expertise. Therefore, in a chapter 9 proceeding, determining a 
fair value for the pension claim could place a great burden on a bankruptcy 
court exercising its authority.297 
One of the major protections for pensions in chapter 11 is found in 
ERISA.298 An ERISA provision requiring that the court declare pension 
termination “necessary for reorganization”299 can be compared with the “best 
 
 290 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 922, 943 (2006). 
 291 Id. § 502(g).  
 292 Id. §§ 502(b), 901.  
 293 See, e.g., Pletz v. United States (In re Pletz), 221 F.3d 1114, 1116 (9th Cir. 2000) (consulting actuarial 
tables to determine the value of property owned by tenants by the entirety).  
 294 11 U.S.C. § 502(b).  
 295 3 NORTON, supra note 52, § 48.11, at 48–27. 
 296  See, e.g., CSC Indus., Inc. v. Belfance (In re CSC Indus., Inc.), 232 F.3d 505, 507–08 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(PBGC argued in a bankruptcy proceeding about the value of unfunded benefit liability claims in a pension 
plan); see also In re U.S. Airways Grp., Inc., 303 B.R. 784, 792 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003).  
 297 11 U.S.C. § 502.  
 298 29 U.S.C. § 1341.  
 299 Id. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(ii)(IV).  
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interest of the creditors” test under chapter 9,300 in which a plan is confirmed if 
the plan is “all a creditor can reasonably expect.”301 The “necessary for 
reorganization” test ERISA provides recognizes that a pensioner holds a 
unique debt obligation and considers whether retaining the pension would 
“hold up” other creditors from invoking a reorganization plan, by requiring the 
court to determine that “unless the plan is terminated, such person will be 
unable to pay all its debts pursuant to a plan of reorganization and will be 
unable to continue in business outside the chapter 11 reorganization  
process.”302 The “best interest of the creditors” test, on the other hand, 
considers the specific proposed plan of chapter 9 reorganization, groups 
pensioners with other municipal creditors, and asks whether the plan that the 
municipality proposes gives creditors what they would expect given the 
constraints of municipal revenue.303 
C. Gaps in Federal Municipal Bankruptcy Law 
Chapter 9 lacks some of the procedural and administrative processes 
intended to provide protection for pensioners in chapter 11 bankruptcy 
procedures.304 The lack of these protections creates significant gaps in federal 
municipal bankruptcy statutes. 
While Congress contemplated including § 1113 protections in chapter 9,305 
the Vallejo decision highlights that chapter 11 has necessary procedural and 
substantive preconditions for rejecting collective bargaining agreements306 that 
are not included in chapter 9.307 Some have posited that § 1113 may have been 
omitted from chapter 9 in deference to state law308 and pension protection 
already provided at the state level. However, the short period in which 
 
 300 Vasquez & Daucher, supra note 119, at 51. 
 301 5 NORTON, supra note 52, § 90.20, at 90-45. 
 302 11 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(ii)(IV).  
 303 See 5 NORTON, supra note 52, § 90.20, at 90-46. 
 304 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1113; 29 U.S.C. § 1341(a).  
 305 Orange Cnty. Emps. Ass’n v. Cnty. of Orange (In re Cnty. of Orange), 179 B.R. 177, 183 n.15 (Bankr. 
C.D. Cal. 1995); Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 2376 v. City of Vallejo (In re City of Vallejo), 432 B.R. 
262, 271 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2010) (“The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 (“1994 
Act”), Pub. L. No. 103-394, 103d Cong, 2d Sess., 108 Stat. 4106, indicates that Congress contemplated 
enacting a ‘§ 1113-like’ statute for [c]hapter 9.”). 
 306 See 11 U.S.C. § 1113.  
 307 See id. §§ 901, 1113. 
 308 In re City of Vallejo, 432 B.R. at 271 (“The Court reasoned that Congress may have decided against 
adding a [§] 1113 to [c]hapter 9 out of concern about encroaching on states rights under the Tenth 
Amendment.”). Note, of course, that under Vallejo, no such deference is given. Id. at 268.  
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Congress passed § 1113 after the Supreme Court’s decision in Bildisco is more 
insightful.309 The arguably modest impact of § 1113 on employees,310 the rarity 
of municipal bankruptcy filings,311 and the fact that Vallejo was a district court 
opinion may also account for Congress’s inaction in comparison to its swift 
action following Bildisco.312 
Congress provided significant protection for pensions in § 1113 by 
requiring a court to review applications to reject collective bargaining 
agreements in an expedited time period.313 This expedited time frame would be 
significant should a municipality seek to reorganize or terminate pension 
obligations. As the case of Prichard, Alabama highlights, having a court review 
a municipality’s underlying claims in bankruptcy in an expedited manner 
would ensure that pensioners are not crushed under the “hammer” of the 
bankruptcy stay longer than is necessary. 
Additionally, the Code provisions requiring payment and giving a claim in 
the case of bankruptcy for a multi-employer plan provide protections for the 
other parties in a joint pension trust.314 Contrast this with the status of a multi-
employer government trust that is held hostage to potential spillover effects315 
if a single employer terminates pensions in a multi-employer municipal fund. 
This could result in increased premium costs for the remaining employers. 
While this impact might be negligible for a small municipality in a multi-
employer fund, the impact could be significant in a large-scale municipal 
bankruptcy. 
 
 309 See Century Brass Prods., Inc. v. UAW Local 1604 (In re Century Brass Prods., Inc.), 795 F.2d 265, 
273 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting that § 1113 was passed within five months of Bildisco and therefore had relatively 
little legislative history); see also McConnell & Picker, supra note 54, at 467–68 (positing that the absence of 
§ 1113 was due either to inadvertence or a belief that “given the special deference paid to state law in chapter 9 
through § 903, state law might be understood to override the power to reject under § 365”).  
 310 See Dawson, supra note 170, at 118–19 (“[T]he fact that every large corporate debtor during a seven 
year period was able to reject its [collective bargaining agreement] suggests that the statute has provided very 
little protection at all.”). But see id. at 113 (noting that a study of the first nine years after § 1113 was 
implemented, the rejection rate for collective bargaining agreements dropped from 67% to 58%). 
 311 See McGrath & Kim supra note 20, at 14 (“There have only been approximately 566 [c]hapter 9 
filings.”).  
 312 See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 541(a), 98 
Stat. 376, 390; In re Century Brass Prods., 795 F.2d at 273 (noting that Congress quickly responded to the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Bildisco by passing § 1113 five months later).  
 313 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (d)(1)–(2) (2006).  
 314 29 U.S.C. § 1341(a).  
 315 Tung, supra note 84, at 905–06 (using the phrase “spillover effects” to describe the impact of 
municipal bankruptcy on the borrowing costs for municipalities neighboring a city invoking chapter 9).  
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However, PBGC pension guarantees, the primary protection for municipal 
pensioners, would not be applicable in a chapter 9 proceeding. While there are 
limitations to PBGC benefits,316 an estimated 85% of employees who received 
benefits through the PBGC after their pension plans were terminated received 
full benefits.317 There is no “Public Pension Guarantee Corporation” acting as 
an “insurance policy” for terminated public pensions; thus, pensioners would 
likely receive only a small fraction of their pensions or less as creditors in a 
municipal bankruptcy proceeding. 
While Congress has not added specific protections for pensioners in chapter 
9, the strong language in the committee reports associated with § 1114, which 
protects retiree benefits,318 and the swift action in passing § 1113319 suggests 
that Congress historically favored protecting the rights of retirees. For political 
reasons, changes to chapter 9 and state law likely would be necessary to enable 
a municipality to use chapter 9 to manage public pension obligations. 
Admittedly, any “solution” to the public pension problem is imperfect, but 
changes are needed at both the state and federal levels to enable cities to deal 
with pension insolvency more effectively from both a preventative and, more 
importantly given the current state of the economy, a distressed debtor 
perspective. 
V. PROPOSED CHANGES TO PROTECT PENSIONERS AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
A. Preventative Measures: A Day Late and [Billions of Dollars] Short 
Preventative measures, the easiest method available for municipalities to 
address pension shortfalls or prospective changes in future retirement 
benefits,320 are unable to provide a municipality short-term relief. Nonetheless, 
systematic and long-term changes to municipal retirement benefit programs are 
necessary to provide lasting stability for both municipalities and pensioners. 
 
 316 29 U.S.C. § 1322(b).  
 317 Keating, supra note 128, at 807. 
 318 134 CONG. REC. 12,697 (1988).  
 319 Century Brass Prods., Inc. v. UAW Local 1604 (In re Century Brass Prods., Inc.), 795 F.2d 265, 273 
(2nd Cir. 1986); see also McConnell & Picker, supra note 54, at 467.  
 320 Prospective changes are easiest because they will not violate state statute or constitutional limits on 
changes to pension benefits. Pensions, supra note 196, § 1176.  
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While some municipalities have reduced pension plan benefits and 
increased the retirement age at which benefits are paid to new employees,321 
municipalities should also implement a more sustainable model by migrating 
to a defined contribution plan, more commonly known as a 401(k) plan,322 for 
future employees.323 Shifting to defined contribution plans would allow a 
municipality to closely associate contribution obligations to benefits provided 
because these plans only require municipal contributions during the time the 
employee is serving the municipality.324 This also prevents future employees 
and taxpayers from having to pay a disproportionate share of costs that do not 
directly benefit them. Additionally, such a change would help a pensioner in a 
bankruptcy scenario because bargaining power of current employees likely 
would be far greater than that of retirees since retiree contributions are 
necessary to provide current municipal services.  
States should also consider explicitly adding municipal pension obligations 
to existing constitutional limitations on municipal debt. Many state 
constitutions include municipal debt limits325 restricting the assumption of debt 
beyond a certain amount326 or requiring voter approval for municipalities to 
assume debt exceeding revenue within a given fiscal year.327 These limits came 
about in part because of a belief that “the benefits of debt creation tend to be 
 
 321 See, e.g., Sarah Coppola, Austin City Council OKs Pension Plan Changes, STATESMAN.COM (Oct. 14, 
2010, 11:03 AM), http://www.statesman.com/blogs/content/sharedgen/blogs/austin/cityhall/entries/2010/10/14/ 
austin_city_council_oks_pensio.html. 
 322 26 U.S.C. § 457 (2006) (mandating that governmental 401(k) plans that were in existence as of May 
1986 were grandfathered in when the 1986 Tax Reform Act was passed; however, government entities as a 
general rule are unable to offer 401(k) plans). Government entities may offer defined contribution plans. See 
Paul M Secunda, Constitutional Contracts Clause Challenges in Public Pension Litigation, 28 HOFSTRA LAB. 
& EMP. L.J. 263, n.25 (2011) (noting that “43% of state workers and 24% of local workers had access to 
defined contribution plans” (citing State and Local Government Employee Benefits, March 2010, U.S. BUREAU 
OF LABOR STATISTICS (Mar. 9, 2011), http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2011/ted_20110309.htm)).  
 323 SNELL, supra note 209, at 3 (finding that only four states (Alaska, Michigan, Nebraska, and West 
Virginia) and the District of Columbia have shifted to mandatory defined contribution plans for new 
employees).  
 324 This solution, of course, would not address the impacts of future retiree healthcare costs. Again, since 
many states allow public employers to change these benefits at any point, these obligations are less 
problematic from a pure “debt perspective.” See, e.g., Doyle v. City of Medford, 606 F.3d 667, 669 (9th Cir. 
2010). However retiree healthcare costs continue to provide issues from a political perspective. This problem 
deserves further review.  
 325 See Stewart E. Sterk & Elizabeth Goldman, Controlling Legislative Shortsightedness: The 
Effectiveness of Constitutional Debt Limitations, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1301, 1313 n.72 (1991) (citing HAW. 
CONST. art. VII, § 3; IND. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art VIII, § 4).  
 326 GA. CONST. art. IX, § 5, ¶ I (limiting local government debt to “10 percent of the assessed value of all 
taxable property” and requiring voter approval for taking on local government debt).  
 327 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 18.  
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concentrated in well-organized groups while its costs tend to be dispersed 
throughout the population.”328 If a municipality was required to seek voter 
approval when creating new pension obligations, the voting process likely 
would serve as a check on short-sighted assumptions of pension obligations 
that future taxpayers would ultimately fund. Additionally, including pension 
obligations in a total debt cap is logical given their long-term nature and is 
consistent with general policies supporting debt limits and “[controlling] 
excess borrowing by municipalities.”329 
B. Curative Measures: Changes to Federal Municipal Bankruptcy 
A former bankruptcy judge described municipal bankruptcy as “[t]he best 
of a bad deal. The best that everybody can see making out of a mess.”330 
Indeed, a municipality that invokes chapter 9 must contend with the same 
challenges as any other debtor. Additionally, there are immediate 
consequences for neighboring local governments, an effect unique to chapter 9 
bankruptcies.331 However, chapter 9 is one of the only available tools for 
managing pension obligations when a municipality is insolvent; therefore, it is 
worth examining how this tool might be refined to further its purpose332 in the 
face of growing municipal pension burdens.333 
Congress has repeatedly taken a reactionary approach when amending the 
Code and other federal laws to accommodate the rights of the individual 
worker.334 While one might argue that these amendments represent a continual 
erosion of treating “like creditors alike,”335 individual workers affected by a 
municipality’s inability to honor pension obligations exert strong political 
 
 328 Sterk & Goldman, supra note 325, at 1365. 
 329 Fred L. Morrison, The Insolvency of Public Entities in the United States, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 567, 569 
(2002). 
 330 Adam Levitin, Experts Examine Municipal Financial Distress, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Dec. 2009–Jan. 
2010, at 28, 79.  
 331 Tung, supra note 84, at 904 (noting that after Orange County went into bankruptcy, other local 
governments within the state were required to offer an estimated fifteen to twenty-five higher basis points on 
short term notes).  
 332 In re City of Bridgeport, 129 B.R. 332, 336–37 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 100-
1011, at 2 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4115, 4116).  
 333 Cnty. of Orange v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Cnty. of Orange), 241 B.R. 212, 214 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 
1999) (“In 1994, Orange County, California, filed the largest municipal bankruptcy in history after failure of a 
risky leveraged investment scheme by its Treasurer.”).  
 334 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 1113–1114 (2006); 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461.  
 335 See In re Nehring, 84 B.R. 571, 578 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1988) (“[T]he bankruptcy court undoubtedly 
will consider the strong policies of the Bankruptcy Code to treat like creditors alike and to grant the debtor a 
new start, and the equities of the events . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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pressure on both Congress when it amends federal laws and local governments 
when they decide how to manage increasing debt. Under the current political 
structure, it would be difficult for a municipality to reduce pension obligations 
even though such reductions are allowable through municipal bankruptcy 
proceedings.336 chapter 9 lacks the employee-pensioner protections found in 
both chapter 11337 and state laws.338 These protections not only leave 
municipal employees and retirees vulnerable, but also leave municipalities 
hamstrung and arguably hesitant to use municipal bankruptcy as a tool to 
restructure pension obligations. 
Chapter 9 should explicitly include protections for workers. Judges should 
review pension debts in an expedited fashion akin to those in § 1113,339 
ensuring that a Prichard, Alabama, scenario, where pensioners had to wait 
nearly six months to determine the status of pension debts, is not repeated. 
Additionally, the equitable principles for collective bargaining agreements set 
forth in Bildisco340 and further articulated in § 1113341 should be explicit in 
chapter 9. Finally, chapter 9 should include the ERISA “necessary to the plan” 
test as a threshold requirement to terminate a pension. These changes 
acknowledge the unique role a pensioner plays in bankruptcy proceedings. 
Not every retiree protection present in chapter 11 is feasible in chapter 9. 
While the ERISA provision allowing PBGCs to assume under-funded, 
terminated pensions arguably provides the greatest protection for pensioners 
under chapter 11,342 the establishment of a similar insurance program in 
chapter 9 may be difficult to implement. The current funding shortfalls in state 
and municipal pensions as well as distressed nature of state and local 
government budgets likely would result in unaffordable insurance premiums. 
Furthermore, political resistance to such a program likely would be extensive 
 
 336 Steven Greenhut, Vallejo’s Painful Lessons in Municipal Bankruptcy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703625304575115551578762006.html. 
 337 11 U.S.C. § 1113.  
 338 See, e.g., Withers v. Register, 269 S.E.2d 431, 432 (Ga. 1980); see ALASKA CONST. art. XII, § 7; 
MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24; Pensions, supra note 196, § 1176.  
 339 11 U.S.C. § 1113(d)(1)–(2).  
 340 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 521 (1984) (noting that a court must consider whether the 
“equities balance in favor of rejection” to determine whether to reject a collective bargaining agreement), 
partially superseded by statute, Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
353, 98 Stat. 376.  
 341 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c)(3) (stating that the court must consider “the balance of the equities”).  
 342 29 U.S.C. §§ 1322–1323.  
HECK GALLEYSFINAL2 12/16/20118:33 AM 
2011] SOLVING INSOLVENT PUBLIC PENSIONS 131 
given the budget shortfalls facing the PBGC today343 and historical resistance 
to federal regulation of state and local government functions.344  
C. Curative Measures: Changes to State Authorizing Statutes 
In addition to these changes to the Code, states should consider establishing 
minimum requirements a municipality must meet before invoking chapter 9.345 
A state blindly allowing a municipality to file bankruptcy could not limit a 
municipality’s ability to restructure pension obligations under the Code,346 but 
a state requiring municipalities to appear before a pension review committee 
prior to filing bankruptcy may be able to monitor these changes. Such a 
committee could evaluate the solvency of a municipality’s pension trust and 
make an initial determination of the municipality’s ability to pay outstanding 
obligations. Members of a committee serving in this capacity should include 
financial experts who could bring the same level of analysis and expertise to 
public pensions that the PBGCs expert personnel bring to private pensions. 
This review process would provide an additional layer of protection for 
pensioners by providing initial assessments of the extent to which a 
municipality is insolvent as well as protection from the harsh consequences of 
the automatic stay.347 
This prebankruptcy filing step recognizes pension obligations as a 
substantial component of municipal debt, and the process would encourage 
municipalities to include pension debt reorganization in any chapter 9 filing. 
This could ensure that municipal bankruptcy is a more effective long-term debt 
management tool. Additionally, this prebankruptcy review could provide a 
greater level of protection for municipalities within the state against the 
spillover effects of individual municipal bankruptcies.348 
 
 343 Olivia S. Mitchell, Retirement Risk Management in Times of Turmoil, 17 ELDER L.J. 439, 453 (2010) 
(“Unfortunately, the PBGC itself faces shortfalls. In a very short time span, the system went from a surplus 
position (having close to $10 billion in the late 1990s) to a staggering deficit more recently.”). 
 344 While I argue that applying PBGC coverage to government entities would be politically impossible, I 
concede that pension insurance would provide needed protections for local government pensioners and should 
be considered, perhaps in a more stable economic environment.  
 345 See Tung, supra note 84, at 887 (noting that some states already impose preconditions for a 
municipality to file for chapter 9 bankruptcy). 
 346 See Cnty. of Orange v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Cnty. of Orange), 191 B.R. 1005, 1021 (Bankr. 
C.D. Cal. 1996) (“By authorizing the use of chapter 9 by its municipalities, California must accept chapter 9 in 
its totality.”).  
 347 11 U.S.C. § 943.  
 348 Tung, supra note 84, at 905–06 (2002).  
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State authorization of municipal bankruptcy is the exception rather than the 
rule.349 While a host of political and pragmatic considerations influence 
whether a state allows its municipalities to access the federal bankruptcy 
courts, economic reality at the municipal level coupled with financial pressures 
at the state level may force some states to reconsider this historically resistant 
stance. If states choose to authorize their municipalities to file bankruptcy, they 
should recognize chapter 9’s potential as a method of successfully managing 
pension obligations and include safeguards for municipal employees, such as 
the proposed pension review process. 
CONCLUSION 
As the case of Prichard, Alabama highlights, using chapter 9 to address 
pension obligation problems result in a host of potential issues, not the least of 
which is political pressure from municipal retirees. The relationship of the 
“debtor” as elected official and the “creditor” (i.e., the pensioner) as voter 
creates a powerful disincentive for elected officials to reorganize their pension 
obligations in bankruptcy. Indeed, the maxim “an ounce of prevention is worth 
a pound of cure” carries particular weight here. Municipalities should make 
systemic, forward-looking changes to their retirement benefits. However, it is 
unlikely that preventative measures alone will be sufficient for many 
municipalities that are losing their ability to provide basic services because of 
looming pension obligations. 
To make chapter 9 a politically feasible and financially pragmatic option, 
Congress should amend chapter 9 and provide protections given pensioners 
under other forms of bankruptcy. States should also perform internal reviews 
of municipal pension obligations as a prerequisite to filing for chapter 9. 
Encouraging states to authorize municipalities to file bankruptcy and adding 




 349 ALLEGHENY INSTITUTE, supra note 15 (observing that currently, only nineteen states authorize 
municipal bankruptcy). 
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bad deal” 350 and could make the chapter 9 option politically feasible for 




 350 Levitin, supra note 330, at 79. 
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